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THE IMPOVERISHED IDEA OF CffiCUIT-SPLITTING
Carl Tobias*
A half-decade ago, the United States Congress considered and rejected
controversial measures that would have split the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit into two courts. 1 The proposed Ninth Circuit would have included Arizona, California and Nevada, while the new
Twelfth Circuit would have encompassed Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
Congress fully aired, particularly in hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, all of the issues that were salient to the Ninth Circuit's division. Nevertheless, Congress ultimately refused to split the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Senators representing every state in the latest iteration of the projected
Twelfth Circuit recently revived the idea by introducing Senate Bill 956,
a proposal that closely resembles the measure debated by Congress in
1990.2 The new bill's sponsors contend that certain factors, principally the
Ninth Circuit's substantial size and burgeoning docket, have now made
division of the court imperative.
Comparison of the new and the earlier proposals and the underlying
rationales of the measures reveals that they are virtually identical. Sena* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank David Aronofsky, Thomas E.
Baker, Arthur Hellman, Kathy Monzie, Jeff Renz, Peggy Sanner, and Ronald Waterman for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, as well as Ann and
Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil
Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the District of Montana
and of the District Local Rules Review Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. However,
the views expressed here and errors that remain are my own.
1
See S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989); see also Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing
Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 AR1z. ST. L.J. 917 (1990) (affording thorough analysis of S.
948).
2
See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995) [hereinafter S. 956). The principal difference
between S. 956 and S. 948 is that the new bill would leave Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the proposed Ninth Circuit rather than placing them in the proposed Twelfth Circuit.
See S. 956, § 2; see also H.R. 4900, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990} (proposing composition identical
to S. 956 in earlier House bill}. S. 956's sponsors had earlier introduced a bill that differs from S. 956
by authorizing seven, rather than nine, judges for the proposed Twelfth Circuit. See S. 853, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
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tors and representatives closely examined the appellate court's bifurcation
and found it inadvisable five years ago. Nothing consequential enough to
require division has transpired since. These ideas suggest that Congress
should leave the present Ninth Circuit intact.
Senate Bill 956 and the issue of circuit-splitting, however, warrant
careful analysis for several important reasons. There have been a few
changes since the earlier bills were proposed. Some arguments for dividing
the Ninth Circuit, such as its ever-expanding caseload and the time which
it requires to decide appeals, may seem more persuasive today. The composition of the Congress is also quite different. These factors mean that
senators and representatives could seriously consider bifurcation and may
well split the Ninth Circuit.
Even if the 104th Congress eschews division of the Ninth Circuit, bifurcation will remain significant. Senators from the Pacific Northwest perennially sponsor legislation to split the appellate court, while members of
Congress representing other areas may introduce measures to divide other
regional circuits. As appeals inexorably mount, pressure to address them
will continue to intensify. In fact, bifurcation will remain important until
Congress discovers remedies for the dilemma of multiplying dockets that
do not involve appellate court division. These propositions show that Senate Bill 956 and circuit-splitting deserve evaluation, and this Article undertakes that effort.
The Article initially describes the origins and development of the proposed legislation. It then assesses the measure and arguments for and
against dividing the Ninth Circuit. I find that there is no greater need for
bifurcation now than before and that the disadvantages of division quantitatively and qualitatively outweigh its benefits. Indeed, knowledgeable
federal court observers differ over one of circuit-splitting's most frequently
proffered justifications: that growing caseloads create complications which
are sufficiently problematic to warrant solutions as controversial as dividing appeals courts. Some experts even consider anachronistic the centurylong congressional practice of creating additional judgeships and bifurcating circuits.
I recommend that Congress not split the Ninth Circuit, but rather explore fundamental reforms, several of which concern the entire appellate
court system. If Congress believes that these alternatives and Senate Bill
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956 are unpalatable, it should scrutinize comparatively modest approaches, principally more circuit experimentation and additional study of
the appeals courts and their expanding dockets. Were Congress to find
unpersuasive the strong evidence of the inadvisability of dividing circuits
and to consider seriously the legislative proposal, this Article provides suggestions for improving the measure. 3
I.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SENATE BILL 956

The origins and development of the recently introduced proposal to
split the Ninth Circuit merit rather comprehensive analysis. Senate Bill
956's historical background deserves a relatively thorough examination because it informs understanding of this measure, even though the origins,
development, and congressional consideration of the legislation that would
have created the Twelfth Circuit in 1990 have been evaluated elsewhere,4
and virtually no new reasons have been advanced to support the Ninth
Circuit's division.

A.

General Background
'

Congress instituted the modern appellate court system by passing the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, popularly known as the Evarts
Act. 11 In 1866, it established a newly numbered Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals consisting of California, Nevada, and Oregon. 6 Congress included
Montana and Washington within the appellate court's jurisdiction on
3
At the outset I feel compelled to admit that comprehensive review of the wealth of literature
which has been written on the appellate courts over the last century has left me somewhat uncertain
about the exact nature of the problems that crowded dockets create, whether they are sufficiently
troubling to deserve treatment and, if so, which solutions are preferable.
• I rely substantially in this section and throughout this article on Baker, supra note 1, and on
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994). I also rely heavily on RESTRUCTURING
JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990), and on the work of its editor and contributing authors, including
Professor Paul Carrington and Professor Daniel Meador. See also Hearing on S. 948 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948 Hearing] (affording congressional testimony and much additional
information on S. 948).
• Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 32, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49
(1988)). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER AND JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-28 (1928).
6
See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 2, 14 Stat. 209 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
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February 22, 1889 and added Idaho the next year, 7 as those territories
became states. Congress completed the present Ninth Circuit by including
Hawaii in 1911,8 Alaska in 1925,9 Arizona in 1929,1° Guam in 1951, 11
and the Northern Mariana Islands in 1977 .12
During the twentieth century, Congress has created two new courts of
appeals and has redrawn circuit boundaries of a few courts. In 1948,
Congress formally recognized the District of Columbia Circuit, 13 which
primarily hears appeals that challenge administrative agency decisionmaking.14 In 1982, Congress established the Federal Circuit and invested
it with national, specialized subject matter jurisdiction principally involving customs, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and claims against the
United States. 111
In 1929, Congress formed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals by removing Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming
from the Eighth Circuit and leaving Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota within it. 16 Congress
7
See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 21, 25 Stat. 682 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988))
(adding Montana); Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 21, 25 Stat. 676, 682 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1988)) (adding Washington); Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 16, 26 Stat. 215, 217
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)) (adding Idaho).
8
See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 116, 36 Stat. 1131 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)).
9
Congress made Alaska district court decisions reviewable in the Ninth Circuit by the Act of
Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 299, § 128(d), 43 Stat. 936 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
10
See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, § 116, 45 Stat. 1346 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)).
11
See Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 34, 65 Stat. 723 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)).
12
See Act of Nov. 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-157, 91 Stat. 1265 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821 (1988)).
13
See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 870 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)). See generally Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and
Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White Hollse, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1987).
14
See Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change, 55 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 715 (1987); Colloquy, The Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 AnMIN. L. REV. 507 (1988).
15
See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Tenth
Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559-1074 (1992).
18
See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)).
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created the new appellate court as a response to caseload congestion in the
Eighth Circuit. 17
In 1980, Congress established the Eleventh Circuit by detaching Alabama, Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth Circuit and maintaining Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in that court. 18 Numerous observers had
voiced concerns about crowded dockets for several decades before Congress
decided to split the Fifth Circuit. 19 For instance, the number of cases that
litigants appealed to the Fifth Circuit had increased ninefold over the
third quarter of the twentieth century. 20
Congress based its decision to divide the Fifth Circuit in part on the
recommendation of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, popularly called the Hruska Commission for its chair,
Senator Roman Hruska (R-Neb.). 21 Congress created the Commission in
response to the importunings of United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger and other federal court judges. 22
After thorough study, the Commission proposed that Congress split the
two largest circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, rather than championing a
more comprehensive solution, such as national reconfiguration of all of the
17
See Baker, supra note 1, at 923-24. See generally Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, The ·
Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60
DEN. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983).
1
• Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.
C.C.A.N. 4236; Hearing on H.R. 6060, H.R. 7665, and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1 (1980); Baker, supra note 1, at 925-28.
19
See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in judicial Administration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949 (1964). See generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER,
A COURT DIVIDED-THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
REFORM (1988); HARVEY L. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-1981 (1984).
•• See Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Fifth Circuit: Or, How Not To Deal
with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 799, 799 (1978); see also Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 697 (1981) (asserting
that "Congress simply could not add judges fast enough").
21 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of the Several judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission].
22 Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1973); see also Baker, supra note 1,
at 925 (suggesting why Congress established commission). See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal
Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1974).
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appeals courts' boundaries. 23 The Hruska Commission was reluctant to
disturb institutions that had gained their constituents' respect and loyalty
after judges and attorneys eloquently testified to the sense of community
that they enjoyed within the existing appellate boundaries. 24
The Commission based its recommendation that Congress divide the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits on general criteria governing realignment which
it had developed: (1) at least three states were needed to constitute a circuit; (2) appeals courts should not be established that would immediately
require more than nine judges; (3) circuits ought to include states with
diverse populations, legal business, and socio-economic profiles; (4) realignment should not unduly interfere with existing appellate court
boundaries; and (5) appeals courts should consist of contiguous states. 211
Congress split the Fifth Circuit because it was large in terms of geography, population, caseload, and number of judges and because the court's
active members unanimously favored division. 26 Creating two circuits,
however, failed to relieve docket pressures. In less than a half-decade, the
new Fifth Circuit had encountered the same crisis level of appeals that it
had experienced before division. 27 By 1989, the Eleventh Circuit's
caseload justified adding more members, but the Circuit Judicial Council,
out of concern that the court might grow too large, adopted a formal,
unanimous resolution requesting that Congress not authorize additional
judgeships. 28
•• See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 228.
•• See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 228.
•• See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 231-32. Cf. infra note 184 and accompanying text
(affording criteria recently developed by the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial
Conference of the United States in its Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts.
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 927.
27
See Speech by Gilbert Ganucheau, Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar (Oct. 18, 1984),
reprinted in 2 Fifth Circuit Rep. 301 (1985); see also Chief Judge Charles Clark, Remarks at the
1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8,
1989), reprinted in pertinent part in Baker, supra note 1, at 928 n.55.
•• See Chief Judge Paul H. Roney, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and
Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 1989); Letter from Chief Judge Paul H.
Roney to Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (Mar. 2, 1989); see
also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION
Acr OF 1995 Oune 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 CoNG. REC. S10436 (daily ed. July 10, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Patty Murray) [hereinafter S. 956 POSITION PAPER) ("dividing the Fifth Circuit
had no effect on the growth of the caseload").
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Earlier Proposals To Divide the Ninth Circuit and Ameliorative
Efforts

There have been numerous proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit since
before World War II. 29 Therefore, the Hruska Commission's suggestion
that Congress split the circuit was anticipated, although its recommendation that California be divided and that one state's district courts be reassigned to different circuits was surprising. 30 The Commission's proposal
to split California proved highly controversial, and delayed serious congressional consideration of the appeals court's division during 1973. Congress was no more responsive to circuit-splitting legislation that was introduced a decade later. 31
In 1978, Congress empowered those circuits with more than fifteen active judges to reorganize their courts with administrative units and to
adopt streamlined procedures for en bane hearings. 32 The Ninth Circuit
responded to this congressional authorization in a number of creative
ways. For example, the court restructured itself into three units to achieve
more efficient and decentralized administration33 and adopted a circuit
rule prescribing a limited en bane mechanism, under which the chief
:iudge and ten active judges selected by lot would sit en bane to rehear
appeals on a majority vote of all active judges. 34
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 928; S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2; see also
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSITION
PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 1686 NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT
(Aug. 2, 1991} [hereinafter S. 1686 POSITION PAPER) (affording additional historical background).
30
See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 235. See generally Hellman, supra note 22.
31
See S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Circuit Breaker-Move on to Split the Ninth, 70
A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (1984). See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 928.
32
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into administrative units complete with such facilities and staff as may be prescribed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and may perform its en bane function by such
number of members of its en bane courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of
appeals.
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of Oct. 15,
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981).
33
See Baker, supra note 1, at 929. See generally OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE UNITED
STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, S. 948 NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter
948 POSITION PAPER); JOSEPH CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (Federal
Judicial Center 1985).
34 See 9TH Cm. R. 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL.,
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 161-63, 200-03 (1976); Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc
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Ninth Circuit judges have increased their output, and the circuit has
implemented numerous internal measures. Illustrative reforms include
prebriefing conferences which help to narrow issues for appeal, limit the
size of briefs, and explore the possibilities for settlement. 35 Circuit support
staff have increased their efficiency, while the court has been an acknowledged leader in employing technological advances. 36 During the late
1980s, the Ninth Circuit reported to Congress that the court's experiments had enabled it to manage a substantial caseload effectively, that
there was no reason to split the circuit, and that the procedures adopted
even provided for continued growth in the circuit. 37

C.

Analysis oj Senate Bill 948

Senate Bill 948, which Congress seriously examined in 1990, warrants
relatively thorough analysis here because the proposed legislation and the
principal reasons enunciated on its behalf closely resemble Senate Bill 956
and the arguments articulated for it. Indeed, these striking similarities and
the lack of changes in the subsequent five years are critical to the new
proposal's consideration.
Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 531 (1986); Report of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States
Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, reprinted in 125
F.R.D. 523, 542-44 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report).
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth
Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859, see
also JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1990) (analyzing analogous experimentation in Sixth
Circuit). See generally S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6-7; CECIL, supra note 33, at 7995.
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 932; Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The
Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1980); see also S. 956 POSITION PAPER,
supra note 28, at 3-4 (asserting that Ninth Circuit has served as laboratory for experimentation in
host of areas). See generally Cathy Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173
(1989); Stephen L. Washy, Technology and Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit,
28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1988).
37
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF THE
OMNIBUS JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JusTICE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1 Uuly 1989) [hereinafter FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS). See generally S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6-7. Indeed, the circuit's experimentation has been so successful that numerous other appeals courts have conducted similar experimentation. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 4. See generally infra notes 201, 262-71 and
accompanying text.
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Professor Thomas Baker characterized S. 948 as the "most credible effort" to split the Ninth Circuit ever undertaken because eight Senators,
representing the states affected by the proposed split, had co-sponsored the
legislation. 38 Moreover, the United States Department of Justice endorsed
the bill in a surprising reversal of the official "no position" approach that
it had previously assumed. 39

In March of 1990, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and
Administrative Practice conducted a hearing in which numerous proponents and critics of S. 948 afforded voluminous, well-considered testimony .40 Four senators from affected states officially opposed splitting the
Ninth Circuit.41 Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) was in this group,
and he was the only member of the Judiciary Committee to testify against
division during the hearing. 42
At the 1989 meeting of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, it went
on record to recommend that Congress reject all proposals to split the
court, and the vast majority of the circuit's active judges opposed division.43 Moreover, Senate Bill 948's advocates apparently failed to persuade Congress to redraw the court's boundaries, while the legislation's
critics seemed to refute convincingly the arguments of the bill's
champions.44
The Senate Judiciary Committee eventually decided against sending the
circuit-splitting bill to the floor in 1990.45 The most important reasons for
38

See Baker, supra note 1, at 933; see also 135 CoNG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989)
(providing statements of introduction by original sponsors).
38
See Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice,
to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, Comm. on the Judiciary 5 (Mar. 6, 1990), reprinted in S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 571 [hereinafter Navarro
Letter].
0
•
See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4.
n See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 280-83, 288-89, 290, 286-87 (statements of Senators
Alan Cranston, Dennis DeConcini, Daniel K. Inouye, and Pete Wilson).
•• See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 288-89 (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
•• See S. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 2; see also infra note 75. See generally S. 956
POSITION p APER, supra note 28, at 3.
•• See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4; S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 934.
•• Sees. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2; s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at
8-9. See generally Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1993, at 12.
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and against the measure deserve analysis. Those rationales will frame the
revived debate over the appeals court's division. Most of the relevant issues received full consideration five years ago, but the recent proposal appears more likely to pass primarily because of Congress's changed
composition.

Major Arguments For and Against Senate Bill 948 and
Responses

1.

a.

Size

Numerous advocates of S. 948 suggested that the sheer size of the Ninth
Circuit created difficulties. 46 These concerns implicated geographic magnitude, the travel and concomitant expense required, the population base
served, the number of judgeships, the circuit's caseload and corresponding
time for processing appeals, and the costs of operating the appellate
court. 47
The Ninth Circuit encompasses nine states and two territories containing some fourteen million square miles. 48 The court's travel expenses were
the largest in the federal system, and the distances that attorneys and litigants had to travel and the concomitant costs which they incurred were
quite significant. 49 It is important to understand that the circuit which
includes Alaska will be enormous. Moreover, each of the appellate courts
proposed in Senate Bill 948 would have been large. For example, Alaska,
Idaho, and Montana counsel in the new Twelfth Circuit would have had
to travel for oral argument to Portland or Seattle, the same cities to which
the lawyers previously travelled. Furthermore, a single circuit which
serves a "large geographic region promotes uniformity and consistency in
the law and facilitates trade and commerce by contributing to stability and
orderly progress. " 110
•• I rely substantially in this subsection on the testimony and other statements of S. 948's advocates and opponents.
47 For helpful overviews of the issues that size implicates, see Baker, supra note 1, at 934-38; S.
956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3-5.
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 935.
•• See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 558 (statement of Mark C. Rutzick). See generally
Baker, supra note 1, at 935.
00 Sees. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3; s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at
2; S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6. The quotation in the text appears in the 1995
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When the Senate considered S. 948 in 1990, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals served a population of nearly forty-four million individuals151-fifteen million more persons than lived in the Sixth Circuit, the
second largest-and approximately twenty million more people than in
any of the remaining appellate courts. 152 The Ninth Circuit, accordingly,
served approximately sixteen percent of the country's population, which
was similar to the population of the Eighth Circuit when Congress divided it in 1929.153 Any appeals court which encompasses California, however, will have a substantial population base.
In 1990, Congress had allocated to the Ninth Circuit twenty-eight active judges, which surpasses by twelve the second largest appellate court,
the Fifth Circuit. This figure is sixteen more than the average judicial
complement in the other appeals courts. 154 Senator Slade Gorton (RWash.), who has led the recent efforts to split the Ninth Circuit, estimated
that the standard caseload formula would have justified ten additional
judges five years ago. 1515
The significant number of judges authorized to sit on the appellate
bench has numerous benefits. For instance, the "court of appeals is
strengthened and enriched, and the inevitable tendency to regional parochialism is weakened, by the variety and diversity of backgrounds of its
judges drawn from the nine states comprising the circuit." 156 The Ninth
Circuit's substantial membership has given the circuit and district courts
considerable flexibility in assigning judges who are able to respond to special concerns, such as sharp filing increases by specific case types or in
particular districts. 157
position paper. However, virtually identical language appears in the 1991 and 1989 position papers.
When this situation obtains, I shall rely on the most recent version and cite to the less recent ones.
01
See Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 4. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 935.
•• See Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 4. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 935.
03
See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 557 (statement of Mark C. Rutzick).
0
' See Baker, supra note 1, at 935.
00
See Position Paper of Sen. Slade Gorton on the "Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1989" (S. 948) 2 (Mar. 6, 1990), reprinted in S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18
(hereinafter Gorton Position Paper].
oe See s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3. Accord s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra
note 29, at 3; S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 4-5; Albert, supra note 45, at 13 (quoting
former Chief Judge James Browning's assertion that court's diversity is an asset}.
01
Sees. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3; s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at
5.
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In the late 1980s, the Ninth Circuit's docket of over 6000 appeals was
fifty percent greater than the appellate court with the second largest number of filings. The Ninth Circuit accounted for fifteen percent of all appeals filed in the twelve regional circuits. 118 If the Ninth Circuit's caseload
continued to grow at the 1990 rate, the number of appeals that litigants
docketed in 1980 would double before the year 2000. 119
During 1990, even with three unfilled seats, the Ninth Circuit kept its
calendar current. This meant that the court scheduled all fully briefed
appeals for oral argument on the subsequent argument calendar. 60 The
maintenance of a current calendar should not be determinative, however.
For instance, some observers have asserted that the increasing number and
complexity of cases intuitively suggest that circuit division would facilitate
the efforts of judges and lawyers to master the court's substantive law. 61
Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mt.) observed that the Ninth Circuit required a median time of fourteen and one-half months to process an appeal, the longest in the country. 62 Only a small percentage of that time,
however, was spent in judges' chambers, from submission to disposition:
2.5 months for orally argued cases and 0. 9 months for submitted cases,
numbers which are lower than the national average. 63 Court reporters and
counsel consumed the rest of the fourteen and one-half months preparing
the record and briefing. Nonetheless, Professor Baker found the 14.5
months statistic problematic because half of the appeals required more
than two years. 64 Even so, he warned that practicing lawyers were expressing little concern about delay, and that splitting the Ninth Circuit would
have absolutely no impact on the aggregate workload. 611
9

See Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 4.
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 936.
80
See s. 948 POSITION p APER, supra note 33, at 3.
81
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 936; Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 3.
•• 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Burns); see also Gorton
Position Paper, supra note 55, at 3 (15.3 months as of June 3, 1989).
•• See S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 9-10; see also infra text accompanying note
127 (suggesting improvement since 1990) .
.. Baker, supra note 1, at 937.
•• Baker, supra note 1, at 937. Accord S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 288 (DeConcini Statement) (asserting that practitioners do not complain); S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 481-83 (statement of James W. O'Brien) (asserting that division would not affect aggregate workload); see also
Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of Volume" in the
•
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Expense is another parameter that implicates size. During 1988, the
Ninth Circuit's expenditures were twenty-five million dollars, which constituted approximately twenty percent of the total cost of the whole appellate system. 66 In 1990, the initial estimated expense of creating the new
Twelfth Circuit was "$5.3 million in start-up costs and $2.5 million annually in current dollars." 67 Logic and prior experience with federal government programs prompted several respected observers to question
whether the new Ninth and Twelfth Circuits would actually yield greater
cost efficiency and net savings. 68
During 1990, Professor Baker remarked that debate over the Ninth
Circuit's size was not always placed in context, while he afforded several
illustrations which do so. 69 For example, the appeals court had more
judges than the complete federal appellate bench and almost twice the
national docket in 1939.70 He concluded that the Ninth Circuit's problem
was workload, not size, and that any measure, which like Senate Bill 948,
kept Arizona and California in the same circuit could only promise a "few
speculative and marginal gains." 71
b.

Consistency

Avid proponents of S. 948, such as Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.),
expressed much concern about the growi~g inconsistency in the Ninth
Circuit, offering the "increased likelihood of intracircuit conflicts" as an
important justification for splitting the court. 72 The statistical opportunities for inconsistency on a twenty-eight judge court are substantial; for
instance, 3,276 combinations of panels could resolve an issue.73 During
1990, S. 948's advocates and Ninth Circuit judges, practitioners, and state
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (1994) (affording valuable additional treatment
of delay and workload).
68
See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 4; see also infra note 144.
67
s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 12.
88
See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 442 (statement of Chief Judge Barbara J. Rothstein)
(asserting that cost "is certain to be exorbitant"); Baker, supra note 1, at 937.
•• Baker, supra note 1, at 938.
70 Baker, supra note 1, at 938.
71
Baker, supra note 1, at 938.
72 135 CONG. REC. $5026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton) [hereinafter 1989
Gorton Statement]; 135 Cong. Rec. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
73
See Baker, supra note 1, at 938.
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bar associations in jurisdictions in the proposed Twelfth Circuit apparently disagreed about the issue of conflicts and about premising division
on inconsistency. 74 The vast majority of active Ninth Circuit judges and
state bar associations found these conflicts insufficiently problematic to
justify supporting the legislation, 75 while the Circuit Executive Office and
other students of the court persuasively repudiated the notion that the
threat of inconsistency posed serious difficulties. 76
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit probably had instituted more measures than
any other circuit to address these conflicts. 77 For example, Ninth Circuit
staff" attorneys fully reviewed every case and coded into a computer the
issues for consideration. 78 The court then assigned to the identical threejudge panels the appeals that raised similar issues and were ready for
calendaring at the same time. Using a limited en bane mechanism to resolve intracircuit inconsistencies concomitantly proved very efficacious. 79
The author of a 1989 study concluded, partly on the basis of these improvements, that the conflicts were less problematic than many attorneys
thought and certainly less than S. 948's sponsors contended. 80
The proponents of division project that it will enable judges, lawyers,
and parties to master the more limited and predictable universe of rele74
Compare 135 CoNG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) with S.
948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 8. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 939 n.112 (citing
NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SURVEY OF DISTRICT JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS REGARDING
THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 19 (1987)).
1
• During the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit Courts, all judges and lawyer
representatives who were in attendance voted by secret ballot on S. 948, and 90% opposed the measure, while 69 of 79 lawyers opposed it. The Bar Associations of Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, and the Northern Mariana Islands opposed S. 948. See Baker, supra note 1, at
939 n.114.
76
See S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 8-9; see also Baker, supra note 1, at 938-50;
Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the
Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989).
77 Sees. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6-7; see also
956 POSITION PAPER, supra
note 28, at 3-4;
1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 3-4.
76
I rely substantially in this sentence and the next on Hellman, supra note 36, at 945. See
generally Baker, supra note 1, at 939 n.116 (citing UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT GENERAL ORDERS 4.1 (1987)).
79
See, e.g.,
948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6;
956 POSITION PAPER, supra note
28, at 3; Baker, supra note 1, at 939-40.
•• See Hellman, supra note 76, at 544. Accord Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The
Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 921 (1991).

s.

s.

s.

s.
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vant case law. 81 Insofar as debate over inconsistency involves the amount
of Ninth Circuit precedent, a phenomenon which enhances panels' ability
to apply precedent selectively, this is a national development that is only
marginally more applicable in larger appellate courts with greater case
law. 82 Splitting the Ninth Circuit, therefore, would not eliminate the
problem. 83
Finally, although splitting the Ninth Circuit might reduce conflicts
within the two new appeals courts, it would also foster intercircuit inconsistency, thereby increasing the burden on the Supreme Court to resolve
conflicts. 84 More specifically, attorneys have "expressed particular concern
that dividing the extended coastline in the West between two circuits
would create inconsistent and conflicting application of maritime, commercial, and utility law in the two circuits, making commerce more difficult and costly, and requiring them to research the law of two circuits for
every potential cross-circuit transaction." 85

c.

California and the Northwest

Some strong champions of S. 948 constructed several arguments from a
northwestern regional perspective, which manifested varying degrees of
hostility toward California. For example, Senator Gorton contended that
litigants in the Pacific Northwest are "simply dominated by California
judges and California attitudes,"86 while Senator Burns argued that residents of states like Montana should not have their appeals delayed because California "continues to experience an economic and population
boom." 87 Senator Hatfield pointed out that creation of the Twelfth Circuit
81

See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 448 (statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner).
See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 448 (statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner). See
generally Baker, supra note 1, at 940.
83
See Hellman, supra note 76, at 597-601.
"' See S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 33, at 3; S. 1686 PosITION PAPER, supra note 29, at
5. With Justice Byron White's retirement, the Supreme Court seems less concerned about intercircuit
inconsistency as the Court's shrunken docket affords it more time to resolve conflicts.
80
S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 28, at 3. Accord S. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note
29, at 2-3. "Potential inconsistencies would be especially troubling in the application of utility rates
along the entire Pacific seaboard by the Bonneville Power Administration. These rate and administrative disputes should remain in a single service area, the Ninth Circuit." S. 956 PosrrION PAPER,
supra note 28, at 3.
88
135 CONG. REC. 55026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989).
87
135 CONG. REC. 55028 (daily ed. May 9, 1989).
82
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would honor Congress's original intent in drawing appellate court boundaries: the establishment of circuits which reflected a regional identity by
combining a "small set of contiguous states that shared a common
background. " 88
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington do resemble one another more than California, but the five states differ in certain respects.
For instance, Alaska's climate and size and the peculiar manner in which
its huge mass of real property is owned may make that state very unusual,
if not sui generis. Idaho and Montana, as landlocked jurisdictions in the
intermountain West, are comparatively untouched by numerous concerns
that are important to the three coastal states.
It is inconceivable that Congress added Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands to the Ninth Circuit to give the court a regional
identity as part of a "small set of contiguous states that shared a common
background." 89 After all, Hawaii and the two territories have diverse histories, populations, and local legal and nonlegal cultures, and are located
thousands of miles from the mainland. Moreover, premising the creation
of an appeals court today on the aspiration to honor original congressional
intent in drawing the appellate system's boundaries may be
anachronistic. 90
Professor Baker challenged the "sponsors' underlying premise that California judges are idiosyncratic and monolithic." 91 He suggested that computerized, rnndom selection of Ninth Circuit panels and a study of the
judges' philosophies rendered these stereotypes untenable. 92 To the extent
that regional factors might apply in specific lawsuits, district judges can
arguably consider them. 93 At the appellate level, the geographical locales
88

See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 253 (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
See supra text accompanying note 88.
80
See supra text accompanying note 88.
91
Baker, supra note 1, at 941.
92
See S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 33, at 9 (analyzing panel selection); Baker, supra
note 1, at 941 (analyzing stereotyping); see also Daniel Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting "California" Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, June 12, 1989, at 2 (suggesting that former Chief Judge Browning
challenged bifurcation's advocates to produce study documenting geographic correlation of Ninth Circuit rulings). When S. 948's sponsors introduced the measure in 1989, a bare majority of active judges
on the court listed their duty stations as California. Indeed, only four of ten judges whom President
Ronald Reagan appointed were so listed.
93
See Baker, supra note 1, at 942 (citing S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 692 (statement of
Eric Redman)).
89
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in which judges sit should be irrelevant. Circuits have an important responsibility to federalize the law; that is, to harmonize local and state
policy concerns with national policy and the Constitution. 94
Indeed, when commenting on Senate Bill 948, former Chief Justice
Warren Burger described as "very offensive [the notion] that a U.S. judge,
having taken an oath of office is going to be biased because of the economic conditions of his own jurisdiction."95 In short, local prejudice offends the very idea of an appellate court, while federal law's balkanization
conflicts with principles of federalism. 96

2.

Miscellaneous Arguments
a.

State Law Mastery

Senator Robert Packwood (R-Or.) claimed that S. 948's division of the
Ninth Circuit would enable judges and their law clerks to achieve even
greater mastery of applicable state law than the substantial expertise
which they displayed in 1990.97 Relevant statistical information blunts the
force of this contention. In 1990, the appellate court entertained more
than 5800 appeals that involved federal question jurisdiction and decided
some 250 diversity cases, three-quarters of which sustained district court
determinations. 98

b.

Reduction of the Reversal Rate

Senator Packwood also argued that splitting the Ninth Circuit might
reduce the frequency with which the Supreme Court overturned its decisions.99 As a preliminary matter, it seems that little significance should
.,. See John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 {1980).
9
• See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 469 (statement of former Chief Justice Warren Burger);
see also Trigoboff, supra note 92, at 2 (quoting Judges Browning and Alex Kozinski to similar
effect). See generally S. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 6.
98
See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 286 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson); Baker, supra note
1, at 942-43; ABA Appellate Practice Committee, Subcommittee to Study Circuit Size, Report 3
(1992). See generally S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 28, at 6-7.
97 135 CONG. REC. S5027 {daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Packwood). Professor
Baker observed that the existing "high level of expertise" did not seem inadequate. Baker, supra note
1, at 943.
98
See s. 948 POSITION p APER, supra note 33, at 10.
99
135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Packwood); see also S.
948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 449 {statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner).
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attach to a particular circuit's reversal rate. Even if the frequency of reversal were considered more important as a theoretical proposition, the
rate is influenced by so many variables, such as cases which litigants
choose to appeal and on which the Supreme Court chooses to grant certiorari, and fluctuates so substantially from year to year, that the concept
lacks much practical value. 100 Moreover, splitting the former Fifth Circuit
minimally influenced the number of cases which the Supreme Court reviewed from the two new appellate courts. 101

3.

A Word About Politics

Certain ideas articulated in support of and against the Ninth Circuit's
division and some express statements of S. 948's sponsors indicate that the
underlying political objective of changing the court's substantive law
partly motivated the bill's proponents. 102 Illustrative is the argument regarding California and the northwest states explored above. 103 Senator
Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) dubbed the endeavor "environmental gerrymandering."104 Former Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin similarly observed that the measure's advocates, who represented "states heavily involved in federal timber distribution ... [were] unhappy with the way the
[environmental] laws were implemented" by the court, and this made the
1989 congressional effort "more blatantly political." 10G
The Ninth Circuit judges who opposed splitting the court may also
have been animated by politics, albeit of a different type. 106 For example,
Chief Judge Goodwin apparently felt compelled to say that he no longer
believed it "appropriate to discuss the motivation" of the legislation's
100
In the October 1986 Tenn, the "Ninth Circuit ranked tenth among the twelve circuits in
reversal rate." S. 948 PosITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 10. In the October 1993 Term, however,
the Supreme Court reversed ten cases from the Ninth Circuit, five from the Fifth Circuit, and only
one or two from each of the remaining circuits. See Preview of U.S. Supreme Court Cases, July 7,
1995, at 7J. See generally Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term,
22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 269 (1995).
101
See Baker, supra note 1, at 943-44.
102
For a helpful overview of the politics in 1989 and 1990, see Baker, supra note 1, at 944-45.
10
• See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
"'' See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 286 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson).
10
• Trigoboff, supra note 92, at 2 (quoting former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin).
10
• See Baker, supra note 1, at 944-45.
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champions. 107 Senator Gorton proclaimed that "as expected, this bill has
been taken personally by the Ninth Circuit hierarchy-God bless their
souls-who has set out to defeat this bill and protect their power base." 108

4.

S. 948's Resolution and a Glance at More Recent Developments

Several factors alone and synergistically may have prompted Congress
to reject S. 948 and to leave the Ninth Circuit undisturbed in 1990. The
resistance of the appeals court's members, the opposition of a few senators
from affected states, and of environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, and the suggestion of the Federal Courts Study Committee that
Congress authorize a five-year study of the circuits apparently explain the
measure's tepid congressional reception. 109
Numerous developments that are relevant to the Ninth Circuit's division have transpired since 1990. Senators and representatives who favored
bifurcating the court sponsored measures similar to S. 948 in 1991 and
1993.11° Congress did not seriously consider the proposed legislation as
witnessed 'by its failure to schedule hearings. Congress also failed to authorize an official study specifically focusing on appellate court caseloads
and structural remedies for addressing them, as recommended by the
Study Committee. 111
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) did complete a 1993 study of structural alternatives at the instigation of the Committee and Congress. 112
The F JC found little evidence to suggest that intracircuit inconsistency is
an important difficulty or that conflicts strongly correlate with circuit
107

Neil A. Lewis, The Ninth Circuit: Northwest v. California, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, at

B6.
10• Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 5; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public
Law and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 997-1000 (1982) (warning of the risks of attempting to modify federal courts for political purposes).
10• See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Committee was an independent entity that Congress
authorized to study the federal courts and make recommendations for improving them. See Federal
Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-09, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988).
110
See S. 1686, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3654, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
111
See supra text accompanying note 109.
112
JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1993).
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size. 113 Moreover, the Center determined that the appellate system was
encountering stress that structural changes would not "significantly
relieve. " 114
The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference undertook a comparatively broad evaluation of the federal courts and published a final report in March 199 5. 1115 The Committee expressed its opposition to circuit restructuring and explored the possibilities of assigning
district judges additional appellate duties and reducing the size of appeals
court panels. 116

In short, Senate Bill 956 has a rich and interesting background which
apparently underlies the measure's introduction by most of the senators
who represent the Pacific Northwest. Much of that proposed legislation's
origins and development and a number of the issues that remain salient
today can be traced to Congress's consideration of Senate Bill 948 five
years ago. The recent measure is examined in the following section of this
Article.
II.

ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 956

Many particulars of Senate Bill 956 and the reasons given for its introduction are analogous to the provisions of S. 948 and the rationales that
supported it. Indeed, the new bill makes only two substantive modifications in the proposal that Congress explored five years earlier. It is important, nonetheless, to evaluate the requirements that sponsors have included
in Senate Bill 956, the arguments which advocates have enunciated to
substantiate that measure, and additional ideas in favor of and against the
proposal, especially by emphasizing those concepts which are new or have
changed during the 1990s.

• Id. at 94.
m Id. at 155.

11

11

•

COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED

STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
RANGE PLAN).
116

See

LONG RANGE PLAN,

supra note 115, at 42, 123-24.

{1995) (hereinafter

LONG
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Descriptive Analysis of Senate Bill 956

Senate Bill 956 leaves intact nearly everything that the sponsors included in S. 948. Provisions governing where the circuit courts sit, the
assignment of active appeals court judges and senior judges' election of
assignment, judicial seniority, as well as the legislation's application to
cases and its effective date, definitions, and administration are either identical or quite similar. 117
The principal substantive alterations govern the jurisdictions that would
be included in, and the number of circuit judges who would be authorized
for, the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits. Senate Bill 956 differs from Senate
Bill 948 in leaving Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in
the new Ninth Circuit, and in originally prescribing seven, rather than
nine, judges for the new Twelfth Circuit. 118

B. Proponents' Arguments for Senate Bill 956

In- introducing the legislation, the supporters of Senate Bill 956 repeated the three major ideas-size, consistency, and the relationship between California and the Northwest-which proponents had espoused in
support of Senate Bill 948. 119 For instance, Senator Gorton stated that the
"Ninth Circuit is by far the largest of the thirteen judicial circuits, measured both by number of judges and by caseload ... [and] the deplorable
consequence of the massive size of this circuit is a marked decrease in the
consistency of justice provided by Ninth Circuit courts." 120 He also said
that California is responsible for fifty-five percent of the appellate court's
filings, which means that "California judges and California judicial philosophy" dominate parties in the Pacific Northwest states appealing issues
that are "fundamentally unique" to the region. 121
Senator Burns, an original co-sponsor of the new legislation, echoed
these sentiments. He reiterated that the "Ninth Circuit is by far the larg117

Compare S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (1989) with S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.

§§ 2-3 (1995}.
118
119

Compare S. 948 with S. 956 and S. 853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995}.
See supra notes 46-96 and accompanying text.

120 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995} (statement of Sen. Gorton) (hereinafter
1995 Gorton statement).
.
121
1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at S7504.
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est of all the circuit courts, both in terms of the number of judges and
caseload," and that appeals remain "pending in the Ninth Circuit for an
average of 14;.2 months." 122 Senator Burns suggested that it was neither
fair nor in the justice system's best interest for Montana citizens and businesses to suffer because of California's continuing population and economic explosion. He' alleged that he now detected bias against inland
states in the federal judiciary as well as in the legislative and executive
branches. 123
Senate Bill 956's advocates articulated several propositions which are
new or represent variations on the above themes. Senator Gorton observed
that the Ninth Circuit had an "astounding 8092 new filings, almost 2000
more than the next busiest circuit" in 1994.124 He also asserted that the
appellate court is currently the "slowest of twelve regional circuits in
hearing and deciding appeals, on average taking a full sixteen months,"
and that the "number of pending cases swelled by almost twenty percent
in the last year." 125 Senator Burns commented that the appellate court
had 6342 appeals pending in 1988 and 7597 in 1993, an increase of
nearly twenty percent, 126 but this information apparently adds little to the
material which Senator Gorton supplied. 127
The large number of new filings is commensurate with increases in
several other circuits, while the figure of nearly "2000 more than the next
busiest circuit" actually constitutes a modest improvement. For instance,
when Senator Gorton introduced Senate Bill 948 in 1989, he remarked
that "the Ninth Circuit handle[d] 2003 more cases than any other circuit," considering 6334 appeals the preceding year. 128 The court does have
the country's largest docket in absolute terms, but the caseload level is not
excessive when compared to other circuits. 129
122
141 CONG. REC. $7505 {daily ed. May 25, 1995) {statement of Sen. Burns) [hereinafter
Burns statement].
123
Burns statement, supra note 122, at $7506.
124
1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at $7504.
12
• 1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at $7504.
12
• Burns statement, supra note 122, at $7505.
127
See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
12
• 1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at $5026.
129
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit stood at 868 appeals filed per panel, very close to the median
of 832 and substantially below the numbers for the two circuits that emerged from the split
of the Fifth Circuit in 1980.... Caseload levels may also be measured by case terminations per judge. The current Ninth Circuit rate of merit case terminations per judge is
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The statistics regarding the average time required to process appeals
and the number of pending appeals are more troubling. It is worth observing, however, that the additional one and a half months of processing
time is relatively small, both figures can fluctuate, and the court lacked a
full complement of active judges during the re!evant period. Moreover, the
"average time from oral argument submission to disposition-that is, the
actual time the judges have the cases in their hands-is 1.9 months, or .5
months less than the national average." 130
Senator Burns was troubled to "see convicted murderers bringing lawsuits against the State claiming cruel and unusual punishment because
they've been sitting on death row for a number of years." 131 The Senator
cited the example of a Montana prisoner who evaded execution for two
decades by pursuing three Ninth Circuit appeals, while he ascribed the
delay in securing justice for the victim's family pan;ly to the court's overloaded docket and its attendant inefficiencies. 132 The Ninth Circuit has
instituted measures that are intended to reduce the number of similar suits
and to expedite review of cases filed. 133 Congress is currently considering
legislation to limit the number of analogous filings and to resolve expeditiously the cases that are pursued. 134
Senator Burns also claimed that the appellate court's division would
"bring much needed caseload relief to the Ninth Circuit while providing
overall relief to states like my own Montana." 135 These contentions are
superficially plausible, but scrutiny reveals that these assertions leave considerable relevant information unsaid. The statements deserve close analysis and emphasis because they apparently typify important justifications
for Senate Bill 956 and for the practice of circuit-splitting.
446, a number which is exactly the national median. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra.
note 28, at 5-6.
m S. 956 PosTION PAPER, supra note 28, at 7; see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text.
Burns statement, supra note 122, at S7505.
See supra note 122, at 87505-06.
188
See NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1994 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
HANDBOOK (1994). See generally s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 4.
131

182

184

S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995}; H.R. 729, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. {1995).
Burns statement, supra note 122, at 57506. The ideas that follow apply both to the proposed
Ninth Circuit and to the proposed Twelfth Circuit.
180
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An example is the notion that the new Ninth Circuit and the proposed
Twelfth Circuit will individually receive fewer filings in absolute terms
than the present Ninth Circuit. This proposition is essentially a truism. It
is indisputable that each new circuit would confront a smaller number of
cases than the existing Ninth Circuit, but it will also have a reduced contingent of active judges to decide them. Moreover, the two circuits combined will have the identical complement of active judges, who are
charged with resolving the same total number of appeals as the present
Ninth Circuit. These factors mean that the new Ninth Circuit, and the
regions served by the existing Ninth Circuit and the two proposed courts,
will realize no net benefit.
Senator Burns's specific allegation that the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation
would "bring much needed caseload relief to the Ninth Circuit" 136 is correct on one level, although this observation omits numerous applicable
ideas. It is accurate that the new Ninth Circuit would receive fewer appeals as an absolute matter than the current Ninth Circuit; however, this
decrease would afford no true advantages and would actually be
detrimental.
Senate Bill 956, by assigning nineteen active judges to the proposed
court, authorizes a ratio of three-judge panels to filings which is significantly less favorable than the current Ninth Circuit ratio, and which
would be substantially less beneficial than the ratio proposed for the new
Twelfth Circuit. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Executive Office recently determined that the realignment proposed by S. 956 would "materially increase the caseload of judges" in the new Ninth Circuit from 868 to 1014
appeals per three-judge panel annually. 137
More striking is the sharp contrast between the 1000 filings per panel
annually for which the new Ninth Circuit would be responsible and the
645 appeals per year that judges on the proposed Twelfth Circuit would
address. 138 The statistics assume even greater significance because the new
Ninth Circuit would confront a more complex and time-consuming docket
than the present Ninth does or the proposed Twelfth Circuit would.
These figures show that the new Ninth Circuit will secure no real
138
137
188

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 5, 6.
s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 6.
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caseload relief; however, it would face a comparatively large and complicated docket.
Senator Burns also did not mention that the composition of the Ninth
Circuit proposed by Senate Bill 956 would complicate the court's future
efforts to discharge all of its duties effectively, especially resolving appeals
promptly, inexpensively, and fairly. Even Senator Burns acknowledged
that the "caseload for the Ninth Circuit will remain high no matter what,
due to the population dynamics in a State like California." 139
It warrants emphasizing that California alone will not constitute the
new Ninth Circuit. In addition to California, the jurisdiction would include Arizona, whose already sizable population is steadily rising, and
Nevada, which is the nation's fastest-growing state. 14° California is responsible for a majority of the existing Ninth Circuit's filings, a substantial percentage of which are complex. Arizona and Nevada generate a
significant number of appeals, many of which are complicated. The proposed Ninth Circuit's composition, accordingly, guarantees that over time
it will have increasingly onerous obligations which are imposed by a large,
rapidly expanding docket consisting of relatively complex filings. 141
l:p short, Senate Bill 956 would not alleviate, but would in fact exacerbate, the new Ninth Circuit's caseload situation. The proposed legislation
would require the court to decide many more appeals per panel, a higher
percentage of which are complicated and time-consuming, than either the
current Ninth Circuit or the proposed Twelfth Circuit. This situation
would probably worsen in the future.
Senator Burns's particular claim that splitting the Ninth Circuit would
afford "overall relief to states like my own Montana" 142 is correct. His
contention, nevertheless, ignores much pertinent material, especially regarding the way that the advantage would materialize. Some of this information has already been analyzed and thus receives less detailed treatment
here.
139

uo

See Burns statement, supra note 122, at 87506.
See 8. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).

141
8. 956 would also place Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the new Ninth
Circuit. Their inclusion will minimally affect the court's caseload, although the circuit and lawyers
and parties who appeal cases from those districts will incur significant travel costs.
"" See Burns statement, supra note 122, at 87506.
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It is true that the jurisdictions in the new Twelfth Circuit would benefit. Most significant, the data analyzed already show that S. 956's allocation of nine active judges to the proposed Twelfth Circuit would provide a
far better ratio of three-judge panels to filings than that of the new Ninth
Circuit and a ratio more advantageous than the present Ninth Circuit. 143
The three-judge panels of the proposed Twelfth Circuit would annually
confront 645 cases, in marked contrast to those of the new Ninth Circuit,
which would face 1014 appeals; the existing Ninth Circuit now decides
868 cases. The proposed Twelfth Circuit would also have a docket which
is less complex and which requires less time to resolve than both the proposed and the current Ninth Circuit.
In short, the Ninth Circuit's division will offer the states included in
the proposed Twelfth Circuit and the court itself important immediate
benefits, which should improve in the future. The circuit will address considerably fewer appeals per panel, a smaller percentage of which are comparatively complicated and time-consuming than either the new or the
present Ninth Circuit. It is critical to understand, however, that most of
the gains accruing to the proposed Twelfth Circuit will be at the expense
of the new Ninth Circuit. The region served by the existing Ninth Circuit
and the two proposed circuits will derive no net advantage.

The above examination indicates that the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation
will give the new Twelfth Circuit considerable relief. Nevertheless, the
benefits realized could be costly and will probably be delayed in the near
term. There would be numerous start-up and permanent expenses, involving time, money, and energy, which would accompany any effort that is as
ambitious as creating a new appellate court. 144
Illustrative are requirements that the proposed Twelfth Circuit devote
time and money to establishing and maintaining Clerk of Court and Circuit Executive Offices, training employees to staff them, and training ad143

See supra text accompanying notes 137-38 .

... s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 12-13; s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at
2-3. The Ninth Circuit Executive Office estimated the initi· 1 start-up costs of creating the new
Twelfth Circuit to be approximately S37.44 million and the additional annual operating expenses of
maintaining two circuits to be S5.19 million. See OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S.
COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, SUPPLEMENT 1 (Sept. 6, 1995). The discussion
presented in the next four paragraphs relies heavily on the first two sources.
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ministrative personnel to manage them. The Twelfth Circuit might be
able to capitalize on the experience of creating the Eleventh Circuit.
However, the Eleventh Circuit was established fifteen years ago; institutional memories may have faded and that court differs significantly from
the proposed Twelfth Circuit. 145
Complications apart from these fixed start.,up costs would attend any
project of this magnitude. Once the proposed Twelfth Circuit exists and
has overcome the basic problems involving its institution, it will encounter
both anticipated and unpredictable obstacles. For instance, the circuit
must master the size and composition of the new court's docket and secure
appreciation of various appellate procedures' efficacy.
The judges of the proposed Twelfth Circuit may experience corresponding difficulties in adjusting to the new system. These features could
range from the comparatively mundane, such as working with unfamiliar
or newly trained appeals court staff, to the relatively serious, such as sitting more frequently on panels with the same colleagues or expeditiously
resolving a different case mix. 146
The Ninth Circuit Executive Office predicted that the proposed
Twelfth Circuit would replicate functions which the existing Ninth Circuit now performs satisfactorily. 147 The Office's elaboration of this prognostication summarized or expanded some ideas above and added several
new concepts:
Administratively, the creation of a new circuit would require duplicative offices of clerk of court, circuit executive, staff attorneys, settlement attorneys, and library, as well as courtrooms, mail and computer facilities. In addition, approximately 40,000 square feet of
new headquarters space would be required, all of which would duplicate offices and space in San Francisco. Further, a small circuit,
with its concomitant small caseload, would underutilize judicial resources and reduce the opportunities for efficiencies available to a
larger circuit. 148
14 • See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. Alabama, Florida, and Georgia are not only
distant geographically, but also have quite different legal and nonlegal cultures than the five states of
the Pacific Northwest.
m For instance, some judges may find the Twelfth Circuit's more homogenous appellate docket
less challenging; see infra text accompanying notes 151-53 (affording more discussion of collegiality).
m See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2.
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit's division would provide the proposed Ninth
Circuit no true relief in the near term and is likely to worsen its situation
in the longer term. Division will have an immediate and long term positive impact on the states that comprise the new Twelfth Circuit and that
court. Nevertheless, the advantages could be rather costly to procure and
their realization may be delayed, while the gains would come at the expense of the proposed Ninth Circuit.
S. 956's sponsors, in recommending that Hawaii, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands be part of the new Ninth Circuit, not the proposed Twelfth Circuit, as S. 948 specified, are suggesting that the Congress create a new Twelfth Circuit comprising a small group of adjacent
jurisdictions which share a common background and a reasonably close
regional identity. 149 The five states that would constitute the proposed
Twelfth Circuit resemble each other more than any of them resembles
California. The jurisdictions have somewhat similar land bases, populations, and economies. For example, each state has millions of acres of national forests, is rather sparsely populated, and is financially dependent on
tourism, extractive industries, such as mining, and renewable resources,
particularly timber.
It is easy to overstate the degree of regional homogeneity, however. For
instance, phenomena such as maritime trade and Pacific fisheries, which
have considerable significance to Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, are of
limited consequence to Idaho and Montana. The local legal and nonlegal
cultures in Seattle more closely resemble those of San Francisco than of
Anchorage, Boise, or even Portland, much less any Montana city. It is
also important to remember that jurisdictions such as Idaho and Montana
historically derived much of their law from California, and that courts
there continue to consult the jurisprudence of California in interpreting
148

S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2-3. This information and the insufficient capacity of the existing facilities to accommodate the new judicial officers, court personnel, and records seem
to contradict Senator Burns's admonition that S. 956 will necessitate no new buildings as the new
Twelfth Circuit will occupy extant Ninth Circuit structures. See Burns statement, supra note 122, at
S7506; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (suggesting that existence of administrative
offices in Seattle may ameliorate certain start-up costs).
149
See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. The five states will also generate relatively homogeneous issues for appellate review.
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and applying their own law. Finally, the notion of an appeals court comprising several contiguous states that share a common background may be
an outmoded precept. 1150

C.

Additional Arguments for

S~nate

Bill 9 56

Additional ideas that the advocates of S. 956 have not expressed or have
enunciated only implicitly support the legislation. Perhaps most important
is a cluster of concepts that come under the rubric of collegiality. Regardless of whether the proposed Twelfth Circuit has seven or nine active
judges,1151 it will have considerably fewer judges than the fifteen the Judicial Conference has suggested as the maximum. 1152
This rather small complement of judges will multiply opportunities for
the court's members to interact. Each Twelfth Circuit judge will serve on
panels to hear cases, work on Circuit Judicial Council efforts, and participate at Circuit Judicial Conference meetings much more often with every
other member of the court. The increased exposure and familiarity among
the circuit's members should facilitate cooperation and enhance productivity in numerous relevant contexts. More specifically, judges who together
must decide a larger number of appeals might well reach agreement and
write opinions faster. They may also develop better means of communicating and resolving their differences and be more willing to assume special
assignments and to assist their colleagues. 1153
An appellate court with fewer judges could offer additional advantages.
One potential benefit is that it might eliminate the need to employ some
extraordinary procedures that can be relatively ineffective. The Ninth
Circuit's limited en bane mechanism arguably offers an example. Critics
"complain that the device is expensive and time-consuming without being
100

See supra notes 85, 88-90 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 162, 164 and accompanying text (suggesting that smaller circuits reduce federalizing role and balkanize law).
101
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
102
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1974). This two-decade-old recommendation is
dated, given ensuing developments such as caseload expansion, congressional authorization of twentyeight judges for the Ninth Circuit, and the former Fifth Circuit's division.
103 I would be remiss if I failed to include the obligatory allusion to the trite saying that familiarity can also breed contempt, a phenomenon which the experiences of certain judges on another
circuit may illustrate. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV.
159, 169-70 (1993). See generally F,RANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29 (1994).
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effective to maintain a unity in the law of the circuit.m 114 Moreover, evidence suggests that the court's judges are reluctant to invoke the measure.11515 On average, the Ninth Circuit has reheard en bane only nine
cases per year. 1156 Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace, however, has been
favorably impressed with the technique, 1157 while the Federal Courts
Study Committee recommended that other circuits adopt the special en
bane mechanism. 1158

D.

Additional Arguments Against Senate Bill 956: The Limited Strategy of Circuit-splitting

There are several arguments against S. 956 that I have alluded to or
treated implicitly above, and they warrant little additional examination
here. For instance, the new Twelfth Circuit's creation would impose significant start-up and permanent costs, forfeit the sense of community
which many Ninth Circuit judges and attorneys now share, and sacrifice
certain advantages accruing from the Ninth Circuit's experimentation
with innovative appellate procedures. 1159 Two ideas, the inadvisability of
creating circuit judgeships and of bifurcating appellate courts nationally
and on the West Coast, however, are sufficiently important to merit additional consideration.
Apart from the Ninth Circuit's specific circumstances, the division of
appeals courts constitutes a limited reform that is simply ineffective. The
larger appellate courts, such as the Second and the District of Columbia
Circuits, that encounter greater difficulties than the remaining appeals
courts, are resistant to feasible splitting as a practical matter. 160 The few
benefits and the numerous disadvantages, including the considerable costs,
1
"'
10
•

Baker, supra note 1, at 930.
See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 7; Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 575.
1
•• See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 7; Baker, supra note 1, at 930.
1 7
Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Address at the Univ. of Cal. Law School at Berkeley (Dec. 2,
•
1982), reprinted in John LateeC,justice on Appeal; A Proposal, Los ANGELES DAILY J. REP., Sept.
29, 1989, at 6, 9.
1
•• FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114-15.
1
•• See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text; see also infra note 201 (asserting that the
Ninth Circuit is valuable for experimentation).
160
See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 587 (1969); Hellman, supra note
22, at 1192-1237.
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which accompanied the former Fifth Circuit>s bifurcation attest to this
approach's inefficacy. 161 Moreover, dividing appellate courts irretrievably
reduces circuits' federalizing role, decreasing their role as national courts
and increasing their impact as regional courts. 162
As a theoretical proposition, circuit-splitting might appear more workable if Congress redrew the boundaries of the entire appeals court system
at once. However, the initial equalization realized by, for example, establishing twenty circuits of nine judges each would be too disruptive. 168 The
symmetry and limited improvements attained would undercut the appellate courts' federalizing role and additionally balkanize the fragmented
law of the circuits. 164 Numerous judges and writers have criticized the
concept of mincing appeals courts as an idea which is even worse than
splitting them. 1615
Dividing the Ninth Circuit or invoking it as a reason to establish many
smaller circuits is flawed because each notion ignores the actual difficulties. Splitting appellate court'> fails to solve one circuit's complications and
simply defers the resolution of the problems of two circuits. 166 The remedy proffered for the Ninth Circuit, therefore, reflects a considerably
broader conundrum.
Allocating the Ninth Circuit's present docket between the proposed
Ninth and Twelfth Circuits will only shift, not reduce, the workload and
would actually impose more burdensome responsibilities on the new
Ninth Circuit than either the proposed Twelfth Circuit will have or than
the existing Ninth Circuit has. The total number of cases to be decided
would remain identical, regardless of the number of appellate courts that
heard the appeals. The difficulties of the largest circuits principally derive
from Congress's historic willingness to authorize more judges and expand
161

See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3, at 10-13 (5th ed. 1994);
Wisdom, supra note 94, at 788.
163
See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 228. "More circuits multiply intercircuit conflicts
and the resulting hegemony of national law is one of the principal banes of the federal appellate court
system." Baker, supra note 1, at 946 (citing Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need
for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1404-09 (1987)).
1
~ See Baker, supra note 1, at 946.
160
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 945-46; Gee, supra note 20, at 806.
166
See Thomas E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J.
725, 742 (1982).
162
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federal court jurisdiction while leaving untreated multiplying caseloads.
Former Chief Judge Goodwin aptly summarized most of these
propositions:
Splitting the Ninth Circuit, or other circuits, would not address the
real problem facing the Federal Courts of Appeals. The problem is
not structure, but workload. Creating more regional circuits would
not diminish the work, but merely divide it. The number of cases
that must be heard by three-judge panels nationwide would remain
the same and continue to grow no matter how many new circuits are
formed. 167

The policy of creating additional judgeships and dividing appeals courts
has eroded significant attributes of the circuit court system. The legislative
approach of adding judges as a response to docket growth has not kept
pace and might have actually exacerbated the problems experienced by the
big appellate courts. The several thousand combinations of three-judge
panels that now exist in the large appeals courts can have numerous adverse consequences. The combinations may complicate efforts to monitor
the law, enhance the opportunities for intracircuit inconsistencies, make
rehearing en bane unmanageable, and strain relations among individual
judges on different panels and between panels and the en bane court. 168
Congressional increases in the number of judges have apparently
yielded few permanent improvements, and this solution has principally
served as a braking mechanism. 169 For instance, a writer who comprehensively assessed the omnibus judgeships legislation 170 concluded that adding
"judges only delayed what appear[ed] to be a nearly inexorable climb in
appeals taken" 171 to the appellate courts and that there had been a mere

187
Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit-No Answer to Caseload Growth, OR. ST.
B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11.
188
See Harry Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 low A L. REV.
871, 918-19 (1983); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and
Workload of Federal judges, 55 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1983); see also supra note 153.
189
See Baker, supra note 1, at 948; see also Patrick Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-the Carcinoma of the Federal judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 270 (1980).
170
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629, 1629-32 (1978).
171
WILLIAM P. MCLAUGHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984).
212

Id.
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one-year effect on the appeals-per-panel ratio. 172 Simply authorizing more
judgeships threatens to worsen the unintended impacts on the circuits.
Expanding the appeals court bench could further tax the judicial confirmation process and might even lead to the appointment of less qualified
judges. 173 A larger appellate judiciary would reduce collegiality among
judges and would foster greater inconsistency, promoting concomitant uncertainty and increases in litigation. 174 Congress may also be decreasingly
willing to incur the expense of creating additional judgeships, much less of
establishing new appeals courts, as Congress exhibits growing concern
about the escalating national budget and deficit. 175
The concepts articulated above have led their exponents and other
knowledgeable federal court observers to suggest .that authorizing more
circuit judges in the context of the present appellate system is a strategy
with limited promise that may even be counterproductive. For example, as
early as 1954, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter warned that the
courts' growing business could not "be met by a steady increase in the
number of federal judges" because he believed that this solution would not
alleviate mounting dockets and was "bound to depreciate the quality of
the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to affect the whole system."176
During 1980, Judge Patrick Higginbotham stated that legislative creation
of additional judgeships "seemed to be the only positive response to the
courts' increasing number of cases ... [but it] ought to be the last resort,
not the first.m 77 Soon after Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit that
same year, Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.) remarked that "Congress recognized that a point is reached where the addition of judges decreases the

ns See Baker, supra note 1, at 949. See generally Laura Little, Loyalty, Gratitude and the
Federal judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699 (1995}; Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257.
m See Baker, supra note 1, at 949; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
m See Baker, supra note 1, at 948; see also supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. This
paragraph and the one immediately above implicate the controversial, ongoing debate over the optimal
size of the federal judiciary. For a sense of this debate, see Commentary On Determining the Size of
the Federal judiciary, 27 CONN. L. REV. 851-913 (1995). See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL.,
IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES (Federal Judicial Center 1993).
no Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
177 Higginbotham, supra note 169, at 270. Judge Higginbotham is the chair of the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules.
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effectiveness of the court, complicates the administration of uniform law,
and potentially diminishes the quality of justice within a circuit.ni 79
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee found that the number of
appeals court judges had nearly tripled in the preceding three decades,
that each circuit had an average complement of thirteen judges, and that
conservative caseload projections suggested the need for 315 appellate
judges and an average court size of twenty-four judges by 1999 .179 The
Study Committee then warned that "tribunals of seventeen, much less
twenty-four, sitting in panels of three, may resemble a judgeship pool
more than a single body providing unified circuit leadership and precedent," even as it acknowledged that "large courts such as these may be
workable." 180 The Committee then questioned "[w]hether tribunals of
thirty or forty judges will be workable," characterizing them as "more
problematic," because the issue is "not simply one of administration but of
the effect, both within the circuit and nationally, of so many uncoordinated opinions from so many judges." 181
It bears repeating that there is a lack of consensus among federal courts
experts about precisely what difficulties growing dockets cause and
whether they create complications that are sufficiently troubling to warrant treatment, particularly with structural measures that are as controversial as splitting appeals courts. Professor Arthur Hellman's valuable
continuing research on the operation of circuit precedent provides a helpful, additional illustration. 182 As of June 1995, he had found no evidence
that the appellate court system needs more authoritative precedents, a determination that seriously questions an essential premise underlying most
structural reform proposals, especially circuit-division. 183
Numerous respected individuals and entities have also challenged the
wisdom of applying structural solutions. In a March 1995 report, the
178

Howell Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980-0verdue Relief for an Overworked Court, 11 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 616 (1980). Senator Heflin did find that
circuit realignment was "necessary in the case of the Fifth Circuit to create a firm base for durable
reform." Id. at 616 n.101. Senator Heflin was chair of the subcommittee that held the hearing on S.
948, and he served as a member of the Federal Courts Study Committee.
119
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114.
18
° FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114.
181
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114.
182
See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 4; Hellman, supra note 22; Hellman, supra note 76.
183
Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved lntercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693 (1995).
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Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference strongly
recommended that circuits be restructured "only if compelling empirical
evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction in a
court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent,
consistent circuit law in the face of increasing workload.m 84 In a 1993
study of structural alternatives, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) ascertained that the federal civil justice system was under pressure, but that it
did "not appear to be a stress that would be significantly relieved by
structural change to the appellate system at this time." 1815 In 1990, former
Chief Judge Goodwin claimed that dividing appeals courts failed to address the actual problem of workload which circuits confront because establishing additional regional appellate courts would not reduce the number of cases but simply split them. 186
It is important to appreciate that there is considerably more agreement
among students of the federal courts that increasing appeals create difficulties than there is about these complications' exact nature, whether they
require treatment, and which mechanisms would most effectively address
the difficulties. For example, Professor Baker's review of the voluminous
literature, including ten major assessments· of the circuit court system, led
him to remark that the "commonly-repeated perception is that the
caseload has come to threaten the federal appellate ideal and some reform
is needed." 187 Notwithstanding Professor Baker's equally thorough examination of the many antidotes which have been prescribed for the rising
number of appeals, he could identify no superior approach and recommended additional study. 188 Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit and
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit concurred that growing
appellate dockets cause problems for which circuit-splitting is not the

1 "'

LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 42. Fifteen years earlier, Senator Heflin had similarly observed: "Changes in the structure of the federal court appellate system are not to be executed
without careful study and much deliberation. Dramatic changes in the demands placed upon a court
which seriously threaten its effectiveness justify legislative and judicial reexamination of the appellate
system." Heflin, supra note 178, at 616.
180 See MCKENNA, supra note 112, at 155.
186
Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11.
187
BAKER, supra note 4, at 33.
188
BAKER, supra note 4, at 295-300.
189 See Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
justice by Recovering Limited jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485 (1995) (book review); Stephen
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preferable solution, 189 even though they disagreed sharply on the best
remedies. 190
During 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee began its discussion
of the difficulties facing the appeals courts by stating: "However people
may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that its appellate
courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions they were even a generation ago." 191 The Committee then predicted that "more fundamental change" seemed inevitable, barring reduced circuit workloads, a prospect which appeared unlikely. 192 By
comparison, in 1993, the F JC det$!1illined that structural modifications
would not significantly relieve the stress under which the appellate system
was laboring, 193 and this March, the Judicial Conference Long Range
Planning Committee strongly opposed circuit restructuring. 194
In short, numerous observers who are intimately familiar with federal
court operations agree that mounting appeals do cause at least some complications which are grave enough to warrant serious consideration of possible remedies. Nonetheless, they also believe that structural solutions are
controversial and that circuit-splitting may be one of the least effective
responses.

A number of knowledgeable individuals and entities have suggested that
the problems of the Ninth Circuit do not warrant structural solutions and
have criticized the court's division. For instance, Michael Traynor, chair
of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, warned that splitting the appeals
court "could fracture the unified interpretation of the Federal environmental laws that the Ninth Circuit consistently applies throughout the
Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the United States Courts of Appeals, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1505 (1995) (book review).
190
Judge Jones prefers "limiting the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction." Jones, supra
note 189, at 1486. Judge Reinhardt prefers adding more judges. See Reinhardt, supra note 189, at
1507. I chose these two judges because they have quite diverse political perspectives.
191
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 109.
192
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 109. When s. 948's
advocates requested that the Study Committee specifically stamp its imprimatur on the legislation, this
entity assumed "no position" preferring to defer to Congress. FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 109, at 123. The Committee did not endorse but explored "various structural
alternatives ... to stimulate further inquiry and discussion" among Congress, the courts, bar associations and scholars. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17.
193
See supra notes 114, 185 and accompanying text.
1
•• See supra notes 116, 184 and accompanying text.
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Western States.m95 Senator Wilson correspondingly posed the rhetorical
question whether the proposed Ninth and Twelfth Circuits would apply
different substantive law "at the mouth than at the headwaters" of the
Klamath River, which begins in Oregon and terminates on the California
coast. 196 Former Chief Judge Goodwin and Chief Judge Wallace claimed
that splitting the appeals court would not address the real difficulty facing
the circuit, its workload, 197 but would merely increase conflicts between
appellate courts for the Supreme Court to resolve. 196 Judge Goodwin asserted that the "size of the Ninth Circuit is more an asset than a
liability." 199
The Ninth Circuit Executive Office offered many cogent arguments
against splitting the court in 1990, 1991, and in June of 1995. 200 The
Office repeated numerous ideas which have already been examined here
and articulated a few new concepts. It criticized division by repeating the
contentions that bifurcation would promote intercircuit inconsistency and
would not treat the basic complication of rising caseloads. 201 The Office
suggested that division would enable litigants to forum shop and that attorneys have encountered little difficulty keeping abreast of the court's decisions because the "number of published opinions issued by the circuit
has remained relatively constant" over the last seven years. 202
Three experienced students of the Ninth Circuit have summarized
many of the above propositions. Former Chief Judge James Browning,
who led the court for fifteen years and who implemented numerous reforms, stated:
The Ninth Circuit is the only remaining laboratory in which to test
whether the values of a large circuit can be preserved. If we fail,
there is no alternative to fragmentation of the circuits, centralization
19
•
198

S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 508 (statement of Michael Traynor).
S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 508 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson).
197
Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11; Albert, supra note 45, at 12.
198
See Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11; Albert, supra note 45, at 12-13 (quoting Judge
Wallace).
199
Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11.
••• See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28.
001
See S. 956 PosITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 4-5, 7-8.
••• See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2, 5. The Federal Courts Study Committee
also seemed to suggest that the Ninth Circuit might serve as an alternative to the approach of creating
judgeships and splitting appeals courts that has prevailed since the 1891 founding of the modern
appellate system. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23.
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of administrative authority in Washington, increased conflict in circuit decisions, a growing burden on the Supreme Court, and creation of a fourth tier of appellate review in the federal system. If we
succeed, no further division of circuits will be necessary. Indeed,
combining the circuits into four or five might well be feasible-creating stronger and more effective appellate courts, lightening
the burden on the Supreme Court, and resulting in a decentralized
and more efficient administrative system for the federal judicial
system. 203

Professor Baker, who recently completed one of the most thorough studies
of the appellate system ever undertaken and who incisively analyzed the
proposal to split the court five years ago, "asserted:
[T]he strategy of adding judges and dividing circuits simply has been
played out and is no longer defensible as a long-range plan. Senate
Bill 948 is an idea whose time has come and gone. The justifications
offered so far for dividing the Ninth Circuit simply do not withstand
a close scrutiny.... Dividing the Ninth Circuit is the least available
application of the strategy of division [because it] will prove nothing
that has not been demonstrated repeatedly, most recently at the division of the Fifth Circuit. 204

Professor Hellman, who has studied the appeals courts extensively and
the Ninth Circuit in particular, contended in a prepared statement during
the hearings on S. 948: "In my judgment, dividing the Ninth Circuit is
neither necessary nor desirable at this time. Rather, the circuit should be
allowed to continue an experiment in judicial administration that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the entire federal judicial system."20 G

In sum, the above examination of the historical developments that preceded the recent introduction of Senate Bill 956 and the survey of the
arguments in favor of and against the legislation suggest that the Ninth
Circuit's division is inadvisable. The next section of this article, therefore,
••• Mary M. Schroeder, Jim Brawning as a Leader of judges: A View from a Follawer, 21
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7 (1989) (quoting Chief Judge James R. Browning). Accord Levin H. Campbell,
Into the Third Century: Views of the Appellate System from the Federal Courts Study Committee, 74
MASS. L. REV. 292, 297-98 (1989).
•o< Baker, supra note 1, at 960; see also BAKER, supra note 4 (providing thorough study).
••• Professor Hellman has also served as Deputy Executive Director of the Hruska Commission
and Director of the Ninth Circuit's central legal staff. S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 654 (prepared statement of Arthur D. Hellman).

1995]

IMPOVERISHED IDEA OF CIRCUIT-SPLITTING

1395

offers recommendations for the future by emphasizing fundamental reforms, such as those which the Federal Courts Study Committee
explored.206
III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The assessment in the first two segments of this Article indicates that
the course of action embodied in Senate Bill 956 lacks promise. The evaluation also shows that the Ninth Circuit and other appellate courts are
experiencing certain phenomena, primarily involving docket growth,
which might warrant attention. The Ninth Circuit's mounting caseload,
the correspondingly long time that it requires to resolve appeals, and the
large number of additional judgeships that the circuit and the Judicial
Conference have requested could deserve consideration.207 It may be
worthwhile to update the information, ideas, and approaches that existed
when Congress rejected S. 948 in 1990; to collect, analyze, and synthesize
the more recent data, and to ventilate the issues relevant to splitting appeals courts.
Congress will probably learn little that is new and may well decide that
the reasons for dividing the Ninth Circuit now are no more persuasive
than they were in 1990. Congress should capitalize on the opportunity
which S. 956's introduction affords, however, to study what expanding
dockets mean for the appellate system. Indeed, Sections I and II suggest
that numerous students of the federal courts differ over the exact complications that growing caseloads cause and whether they are serious enough
to justify treatment, and, if so, over which measures will best address the
difficulties. Nonetheless, observers believe that the rising rate of appeals
can be problematic and that circuit splitting is at best a palliative.
208
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMITfEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-23. On September
13, 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on S. 956. Witnesses provided virtually no
new information on bifurcating the Ninth Circuit. A partial exception was Ninth Circuit Judge
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain. He may have been the first active judge of the court to endorse publicly the
idea of splitting the Ninth Circuit. Judge O'Scannlain also proposed that California be divided. The
Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1995) (statement of Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit).
Even that idea was not new, as the Hruska Commission had proposed the concept two decades ago.
See infra text accompanying notes 302-05.
207
See supra notes 54-55, 58-59, 62, 64, 120, 122, 124-25, infra note 288 and accompanying
text.
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This section emphasizes basic reform proposals. Almost all of these options are controversial and Congress may not adopt any of them; therefore, this section then proposes more modest approaches, such as future
appellate court experimentation and additional study of the circuits and
their growing dockets. Finally, it suggests improvements to S. 956 should
senators and representatives seriously consider the legislation. 208

A.

Comparatively Fundamental Reforms Principally Relating to Appellate Structure
1.

Federal Courts Study Committee Proposals
a.

Descriptive Analysis of the Proposals

The efforts of the Federal Courts Study Committee are a helpful departure point for assessing comparatively fundamental reforms that principally implicate the appeals courts' structure. 209 During 1990, the Committee evaluated several essential structural possibilities to address
mounting appellate caseloads. Its report discussed five of those prospects
to promote future inquiry and debate among Congress and the legal
community. 210
The Committee's initial proposal was that circuit boundaries be periodically redrawn to attain regional appeals courts of nine judges and that the
20
• The earlier apologia suggests my uncertainity about the precise character of the difficulties
that rising numbers of appeals cause, whether they are sufficiently problematic to warrant treatment,
and, if so, which remedies are best. See supra note 3. Even if I were more confident about identification of the problems, no solution seems clearly superior, much less a panacea. Therefore, I attempt
selectively to designate and evaluate those approaches which seem more promising. Congress· should
also keep in mind the possibility of less global solutions, such as circuit-specific remedies.
20
• I rely substantially in this subsection on the FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 109, at 118-23, and the valuable elaboration of the Committee's proposals in BAKER,
supra note 4, at 238-79, as well as on the work of several contributors to Hellman, supra note 4. The
exhaustive evaluation of the benefits and disadvantages of the approaches in these sources and the
examination of certain aspects of two of the above five options obviate the need to offer more than
descriptive analyses in this section. Because court consolidation is apparently a preferable approach, I
accord it more detailed treatment. For alternatives other than the five structural options which the
Federal Courts Study Committee explored, I attempt to evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of the
approaches. Insofar as I have preferences, I try to indicate and justify them. It is important to remember that no remedy appears to be a panacea, that circuit-specific solutions may be preferable, and that
Congress must make the ultimate policy determination .
... FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17.
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existing geographic circuits be dissolved. 211 This alternative would require
the new circuits to follow prior precedent declared by panels in each region unless overruled by the Supreme Court. This option contemplated a
centralized division of representative judges, functioning as a type of national en bane court, which would review panel determinations to resolve
inconsistencies. This would limit the number of conflicts that having more
circuits would inevitably produce. 212
A second suggestion was to create a new appellate level. 213 Approximately twenty-five regional appellate divisions with nine judges each
would hear appeals of right, and five higher-tier appellate courts encompassing larger geographic areas would entertain discretionary appeals
from these divisions. The Supreme Court would exercise discretionary jurisdiction to consider appeals from the upper-tier tribunals. 214
A third proposal was to establish courts with national subject matter
jurisdiction in areas such as admiralty, civil rights, and labor, which
would coexist with the current circuits. 215 A variation on this theme was
the creation of subject matter panels in the present appellate courts. 216
The Study Committee's fourth proposal was to merge the existing circuits
into one centrally organized tribunal with the power to establish and abrogate subject matter panels as necessary. 217 The new entity could correspondingly formulate internal procedures to resolve inconsistencies. 218 The
Committee's final suggestion was the consolidation of the current appeals
courts into some five '~umbo" circuits, each of which would resemble the

211
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 118-19; see also supra
notes 163-65 and accompanying text (affording additional critical analysis).
212
See BAKER, supra note 4, at 239-42 (providing additional valuable analysis).
213
See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 119-20.
214
See BAKER, supra note 4, at 230-61.
21
• See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 120-21; see also
Carrington, supra note 160, at 604-12 (affording additional analysis); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989) (same). See generally ABA Report, supra note 34, at 532-40.
••• See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 120-21; see also
BAKER, supra note 4, at 261-69; Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution
Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983).
217
See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 121.
218
See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 269-76 (affording additional valuable analysis).
219
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23.
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present Ninth Circuit. 219 Members of these jumbo courts might rotate
among subject matter panels in specialized fields. 220
The Committee's principal purpose in presenting these five options was
to stimulate discussion. 221 The Committee may have been suggesting that
consolidation and the existing Ninth Circuit might create alternatives to
the traditional strategy of adding judges and dividing appeals courts that
Congress has followed since it passed the Evarts Act in 1891.222

b.

A Closer Look at Consolidation

Creating judgeships and splitting appellate courts may well be ideas
whose time has passed. If Congress believes, nonetheless, that additional
judges are an appropriate response to steadily rising caseloads, it should
seriously consider consolidating the intermediate appeals court system.
Consolidation treats the Ninth Circuit as a model rather than a problem
to be rectified. 223 Congress can extract instructive insights from the Ninth
Circuit's creative approaches to appellate procedure, modernization, reorganization of administrative structures, and employment of technology, all
of which have contributed to an efficient, consistent circuit despite its
size. 224
Consolidation would reduce conflicts among appeals courts, a major
weakness of the existing appellate structure. 225 Intercircuit inconsistency
arises when appellate court judges refuse to consider dispositive other regional appeals courts' opinions and invoke the law of their circuit and
rehearings en bane to address expanding dockets and increasing judgeships. 226 The consolidation of existing courts, by abolishing the circuits'
geographical boundaries and merging them into a single unified administrative and jurisdictional tier, would eliminate these conflicts among appellate courts, although the enhanced intracircuit inconsistency must be
treated.
••• See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 277-79 .
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17. See generally J.
Wallace, The Case For Large Federal Courts of Appeals, 77 JumcATURE 288 (1994) .
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23.
Baker, supra note 1, at 953.
2
" ' See Baker, supra note 1, at 953-54; supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
••• See Baker & McFarland, supra note 163, at 1404-09; Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times
Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 720-24 (1981).
••• See Baker, supra note 1, at 954.

..,
Clifford
•••
•••
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Unification would create one United States Court of Appeals and eliminate the Federal Circuit and the regional appeals courts.227 Three-judge
panels that would be consolidated from some forty regular "general divisions," typically consisting of four judges from different, neighboring
states, would continue to resolve cases. 228 Every general division would
exercise jurisdiction over appeals from a similar number of designated district judges.
Increases in oral presentations and dispositions and reductions in written opinions are this plan's hallmarks. Cases that raise important issues of
federal law would require supplementation of panels with four additional
judges drawn from "special divisions" identified by subject area. 229 Members of these augmented courts would participate in judicial conferences
and collegial deliberations, circulate and extensively amend draft decisions, and issue published opinions. Supplemental determinations would
have effect across the country, thus nationalizing the current idea of the
law of the circuit.
Proponents of consolidation claim that it will lead to the expeditious,
inexpensive, and equitable resolution of appeals. 230 The system would also
promote more coherent national law and end conflicts among appellate
courts. This course of action would alleviate judges' concern about maintaining the law of the circuit and would utilize judicial officers more
efficiently. 231
Unification is controversial, however. Critics have suggested that this
model might fragment and specialize the bench, while the approach could
facilitate congressional creation of more judgeships because it can absorb
227
Several observers have considered this model. See Carrington, supra note 160, at 612-17;
Maurice Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility To Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 591-95 (1974); J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 940-41
(1983); see also Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits - A Plug for a Unified
Court of Appeals, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 455, 465-69 (1995) (affording recent iteration of concept). I
rely substantially on Professor Baker's distillation of Professor Carrington's blueprint, and I mean to
illustrate recent thinking about consolidation by generalizing from the Ninth Circuit's experience. See
Baker, supra note 1, at 955-59; see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 269-76 (affording additional valuable analysis).
228
See Baker, supra note 1, at 955.
229
See Baker, supra note 1, at 956.
230
See Baker, supra note 1, at 957-58. See generally Meador, supra note 215.
231
See Baker, supra note 1, at 955-59.
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an indeterminate number of new judges. The complicated structure could
pose difficult organizational challenges. Moreover, every general division,
which would no longer be required to publish opinions in most cases,
could ignore nationally applicable law. In short, consolidation appears
promising enough for Congress to consider this possibility carefully.

2.

Alternative Structural Reforms

Apart from the five responses to increasing appellate dockets that the
Federal Courts Study Committee explored, there are several alternatives
that deserve mention. 232 One option that the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference has explored is restricting the number of
circuit court judges who must decide cases. 233 The Committee suggested
that appeals court panels might consist of two judges, and it proposed
experimenting with single-judge review in cases that present one issue and
are subject to deferential review standards. 234 The most obvious benefit of
limiting the si:ze of circuit panels would be the savings in time and effort
that could be redirected to other judicial responsibilities.
The application of both approaches might compromise the quality of
appellate justice which litigants have traditionally received. 2311 Two-judge
panels could have difficulty resolving their disagreements over the merits
of appeals, 236 and single-judge review may significantly restrict appellate
oversight of certain categories of cases. 237 These potential complications,
together with a lack of clarity about the likely benefits, mean that Congress might prefer to consider the possibility of authorizing limited
experimentation.
282
I devoted less analysis to the five options that the Federal Courts Study Committee explored
than to the alternatives considered here because these options have received less secondary treatment.
This is obviously not an exhaustive, but rather a selective, represen!ative analysis of reforms. For
additional discussion of these and other reforms, see BAKER, supra note 4; MCKENNA, supra note
112; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115; Hellman, supra note 4.
288
See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123-24.
234
See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 124.
2
•• For explication of the idea of the appellate ideal, see BAKER, supra note 4, at 14-17, 21-30.
238
The obvious problem is one-to-one votes, but special provisions can be made for this situation. See ABA Report, supra note 34, at 550.
237
This may be especially true of cases that judges deem less worthy of consideration. See infra
note 251 and accompanying text. For helpful analysis of adjunct judicial officers, such as appellate
commissioners, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123; MCKENNA, supra note 112, at 12933; Oakley, supra note 35, at 915-21.
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Two additional alternatives, differentiated appeal management and enhanced reliance on district judges, can be conceptualized either as variations on discretionary appellate review or as hybrids of that option and
structural reform. 238 The Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference, among others, has examined differentiated appeal management or "two-track" appellate review. 239
In this plan, three-judge screening panels would review cases for assignment. The appeals that judges identify for Track Two would receive
plenary review, while the cases designated for Track One would receive
summary disposition, perhaps with judgment orders that affirm the district court. 240 Permitting one of the screening panels' judges to place appeals on Track Two should counter the possibilities that circuits might
hastily resolve cases or might not fully review specific classes of appeals. If
the assignment of cases to Track Two yields greater temporal savings
than resource expenditures, judges could devote additional attention to
other duties, such as hearing more complex appeals. 241
Assigning some circuit court functions to district judges through "appellate terms" or "appellate divisions" is another approach that a number of
observers have proposed over the last half-century. 242 The panels would
principally insure error correction and screen issues of law for potential
appeals court review, while additional consideration would only be afforded in the circuit court's discretion on petition, unless the first appellate
panel certified the appeal. 243
The system would prohibit trial judges from hearing cases from their
own districts. 244 The Judicial Conference Long Range Planning Committee suggested that circuit courts experiment with greater use of district
judges, that such a program be restricted initially to particular categories
238

See infra text accompanying notes 247-54 (discussing discretionary appellate review).
See Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Report
to the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning (1993); see also MCKENNA, supra
note 112, at 127-29 n.226 (affording analysis of procedure). See generally Oakley, supra note 35, at
862-68.
240
See McKENNA, supra note 112, at 127-29.
241
I subject all three approaches examined in the text to similar cost-benefit analysis .
... See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 390 (1941); Louis H.
Pollak, Amici Curiae, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 825-26 {1989) (book review).
•< 3 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123-24.
20
See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123-24.
239
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of appeals, and that Congress enlarge the pilot project's jurisdiction if it
proves successful. 2411
Proponents of enhanced dependence on district court judges believe that
such a system would offer a number of benefits, primarily by reducing
current workloads of appellate court judges, thus giving them more time
to consider a smaller number of appeals. The proposal would, however,
necessitate a significant increase in the corps of district judges required to
discharge these augmented responsibilities. Moreover, this model places
substantial reliance on district judges, who were not appointed for this
purpose and who may lack the experience, training, and temperament
needed for these enlarged appellate court duties. 246 The dubious ratio of
benefits to disadvantages which the approach would apparently afford
means that it deserves less serious consideration.

3.

Discretionary Appellate Review

The replacement of the statutory right of appeal with discretionary review, perhaps patterned on the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, is
an important potential means of addressing docket growth in addition to
structural measures. 247 Discretionary appellate review would oblige the
circuits, individually or together, to develop procedures and criteria for
deciding which appeals to hear.
Advocates contend that such a proposal would afford numerous advantages. For instance, the discretionary approach would save time, money,
and effort. 248 Those cases that courts do designate for review would receive better treatment, including traditional collegial and deliberative ap-

••• See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 124.
••• Of course, many district judges currently assume these duties when they sit by designation on
appeals courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). See generally Richard B. Saphire &
Michael E. Solimine, Diluting justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court
judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 35
(1995) .
... See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993); BAKER, supra note 4, at 234-38; MCKENNA,
supra note 112, at 123-27. See generally Harlan Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less)
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985).
••• See Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeal, 34
Sw. L.J. 1151, 1157 (1981). See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 235.
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pellate procedure, because judges would be processing fewer other
appeals. 249
One difficulty with discretionary review is whether it would pass constitutional muster. 2150 A second concern is whether this alternative is desirable as a policy matter. It would substantially modify the appeal of right, a
procedure which has enjoyed a long and rich history in the federal courts.
More specifically, the discretionary procedure would additionally compromise the ability of circuits to correct errors and could ration their scarce
resources into specific classes of cases which are deemed more worthy· of
consideration than others. 2151
The Subcommittee on Structure of the Federal Courts Study Committee asserted that this model would not be an improvement because discretionary review "must be somewhat painstaking unless it is to do violence
to the tradition of appellate error correction.''2152 The full Committee characterized "certiorari for the courts of appeals as a last resort" even while
encouraging "further study of the concept." 2153 Professor Baker and Professor Judith Resnik suggested that the option would take the circuit
courts "much farther away from our appellate tradition," granting district
judges too much authority and depriving parties of too much. 2154 Because
discretionary review would significantly change a time-honored, valuable
federal court institution, Congress should probably consider it only after
exhausting other less controversial options.

4.

Miscellaneous Reforms

Several other substantial reforms deserve examination. The most important suggestion is restricting the original civil or criminal jurisdiction ·
of federal district courts. 21515 'The candidates for limitation are diversity of
249

See Lay, supra note 248, at 1157-58.
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38
S.C. L. REV. 411, 412-17 (1987); Michael Vitiello, The Appellate Lawyer's Role in the Caseload
Crisis, 58 MISS. L.J. 437, 444-59 (1988) .
... See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 287-88 (1981); see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 237.
••• BAKER, supra note 4, at 237 n.37 (citing Report of the Subcommittee on Structure to the
Federal Courts Study Committee 34 (1990)).
3
•• FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 109, at 116.
... See BAKER, supra note 4, at 237-38; Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 603, 619 (1985). See generally ABA Report, supra note 34, at 547.
,
••• This was a central premise of the Long Range Planning Committee's Plan. See LONG
200
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citizenship jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Unfortunately,
modifying diversity jurisdiction would provide little relief because trial
court determinations in diversity cases constitute a minuscule percentage
of the appellate docket. 2156 Moreover, it is politically unrealistic to expect
that Congress will meaningfully restrict federal question jurisdiction. 2157
These potential limitations on civil jurisdiction, therefore, warrant minimal additional treatment here.
Congress could also restrict appellate caseloads by reducing district
courts' criminal jurisdiction. However, the perceived political gains to be
derived from expanding federal criminal law, "'.'hi ch the 1994 crime legislation's passage trenchantly reaffirmed, make the prospect of limiting
criminal jurisdiction even less likely. 2158 Furthermore, narrowing civil or
criminal jurisdiction is purely derivative and would rely on the decreased
number of appeals which litigants would take from fewer district court
filings. 2159 In sum, restricting civil and criminal jurisdiction lacks promise
because neither solution appears to be politically feasible. 260
RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 23-37.

••• See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Even the legal reforms in the ninth tenet of the
Contract With America do not directly attack diversity; see also CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 34,
at 193-94. See generally Carl Tobias, Common Sen-se and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV.
699 (1995).
207
See Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29,
34-37 (1990). Since the 1960s, Congress has continued to recognize new federal civil causes of action.
See Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party joinder, 65 N.C. L. REV. 745,
757 (1987); see also CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 34, at 192-93. But see Jones, supra note 189,
at 1486.

••• See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796 (1994). Congress could make numerous changes in substantive criminal law that would
significantly affect the federal courts' workload. For instance, Congress might reform the controversial, time-consuming federal sentencing guidelines or the drug laws.
••• There are numerous measures that seek to expedite the resolution, and termination, of criminal and civil cases that are pursued in district courts. See, e.g., Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990). More specifically, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a favored technique for diverting
cases at the trial court level. Numerous circuit courts correspondingly use a number of appellate ADR
techniques whose use could be quantitatively and qualitatively expanded. See supra note 35, infra
note 265 and accompanying text.

° For additional discussion of these and other reforms, see BAKER, supra note 4; LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 115; MCKENNA, supra note 112; Hellman, supra note 4.
28
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Comparatively Modest Approaches

If Congress declines to make the basic reforms surveyed above and rejects S. 956, relatively modest approaches would warrant consideration, as
the size of appeals courts' membership and dockets continues to grow and
increasingly resembles the Ninth Circuit. 261 The following recommendations for additional study and experimentation are principally directed to
the Congress, although the appellate courts could institute most of the
recommendations absent legislative authorization.

1.

Experimentation

Should Congress reject the rather fundamental reforms enumerated already and S. 956, it ought to encourage new experimentation which treats
the rising number of appeals and support ongoing initiatives instituted by
many circuits. Congress could sponsor efforts to test the numerous options
that federal court observers have proposed over the last century.
Examples of such experimentation are assigning greater appellate responsibilities to district judges and reducing the size of appeals court
panels, both of which the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range
Planning recently explored. 262 More specifically, Congress could empower
several circuits to experiment with the alternatives for a period that is
sufficient to gauge their worth and mandate a careful study by the Federal
Judicial Center of their efficacy, in terms of saving time and expense and
of judicial and litigant satisfaction, for instance. 263
Illustrative of continuing endeavors which Congress should support is
the Ninth Circuit's creative work implicating administrative reorganization, appellate settlement, use of technology, and the limited en bane technique.264 Most of the other appeals courts have tested numerous mecha261
See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23. I afford
suggestions relating to these approaches before recommendations respecting S. 956 principally for ease
or analysis, although the organizational structure selected admittedly reflects the policy choices that I
consider most promising. Were Congress to consider seriously or even pass S. 956, it should seriously
explore incorporating certain aspects or the suggestions relating to experimentation and additional
study.
262
See supra notes 233-37, 242-46 and accompanying text:
263
Many additional possibilities could be offered. For enumeration or these possibilities, see
BAKER, supra note 4; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115; Hellman, supra note 4.
264
See supra notes 32-37, 154-58 and accompanying text.
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nisms that are both similar and different. For example, the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits have instituted ambitious prehearing conference programs that resemble the Ninth Circuit efforts. 265 In comparison, the
Ninth Circuit premised its Capital Punishment Project on earlier Fifth
and Eleventh Circuit initiatives. 266 Application of various other alternatives by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits should be instructive because both
circuits have large complements of judges and substantial, growing
caseloads. 267 Moreover, nearly all appellate courts decide a significant
percentage of cases without oral argument, 266 while practically every circuit resolves many appeals without issuing published or even written
opinions. 269
Congress must insure that any such experimentation receives rigorous
analysis as a predicate for future policymaking.270 An independent evaluator should scrutinize the application of the measures' application for
enough time and in sufficiently diverse contexts to ascertain as definitively
as possible whether the mechanisms are effective, for example, in expediting cases or improving the quality of appellate justice dispensed. Several
Federal Judicial Center studies and the RAND Corporation's comprehensive assessment of the expense and delay reduction procedures that district courts implemented under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 can
••• See supra note 35; see generally ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & ALLAN LIND, A REEVALUATION
OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN (Federal Judicial Center 1983) (affording analysis of
Second Circuit program).
••• See 1994 Ninth Circuit Capital Punishment Handbook, supra note 133, at Introductory
Notes.
••• See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. See generally William T. Rule & Jeffrey
Jackson, After the Split-The Recent Workload of the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth judicial Circuit, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 281 (1994).
••• See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 35; Alvin B. Rubin & Gilbert Ganucheau, Appellate Delay and
Cost-An Ancient and Common Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 Mn. L. REV. 752 (1983). See generally JoE CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT (Federal Judicial
Center 1987); ABA Report, supra note 34, at 526.
••• See FED. R. APP. P. 36; BAKER, supra note 4, at 158-64; William L. Reynolds & William
M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 573 (1981); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable

s.

Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals,
87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989). See generally WRIGHT, supra note 162, at 767.
••• For discussions of rigor, see Carl Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government Sponsored Public Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1164 (1986); Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public
Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 954 (1982).
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serve as valuable models. 271 Congress could also explore whether it should
encourage a broader exchange of ideas regarding promising approaches,
although the circuits, particularly through the judicial councils, and bodies
such as the F JC and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, already promote much interchange.

2.

Additional Study

Congress could authorize additional study of the appeals courts and
their dockets. The numerous analyses of the ostensible difficulties that
mounting appellate caseloads create and the many remedies prescribed-a
number of which have been reviewed in this Article-may suggest that
the complications and their solutions have received adequate examination
and that Congress should now act. 272
The advisability of undertaking another evaluation, nonetheless, finds
support in the disagreement about whether the phenomena ascribed to
increasing dockets actually produce difficulties that are sufficiently troubling to warrant treatment, and, if so, which responses would be most efficacious. Indeed, the Federal Courts Study Committee urged that a careful,
comprehensive assessment be performed to overcome imperfect knowledge
of the relevant complications, their impacts, and potential remedies. 273
Professor Baker made a similar recommendation after conducting an exhaustive survey of the circuits. 274

271

See, e.g., THOMAS WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (Federal Judicial
Center 1988); Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation
of the Pilot Program of the Civil justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (1994). See
generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1589 (1994).
272
See Reinhardt, supra note 189, at 1512. After all, as Judge Reinhardt states, evaluators have
conducted ten major studies. See also BAKER, supra note 4, at 33-43 (summarizing ten studies}.
273
See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17; see also
Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 575
(1967).
21
• See BAKER, supra note 4, at 292-300; Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act
and Civil justice Reform Act, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration ofJustice of the House Committee on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91
(1990) (prepared statement of Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Federal Courts Study Committee, and
Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit} [hereinafter Weis statement).
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The specifics of such an evaluation require relatively brief treatment
here, as analogous study proposals have been examined elsewhere. 2711 The
success of the Federal Courts Study Committee indicates that it could
serve as a helpful model, 276 even though senators and representatives
should attempt to learn from the problems that the Committee encountered to avoid repeating them. Illustrative are legislative assignment to an
entity which consisted of individuals with demanding professional occupations of the responsibility for scrutinizing most of the federal courts' structure, jurisdiction, procedures, and practices in an eighteen month period.
This idea suggests that Congress might seriously consider funding a fulltime professional staff, crafting a narrow, particularized charge, and giving the group at least two years to complete its work.
Congress should create an entity like the Federal Courts Study Committee, which would include representatives from Congress, the federal
judiciary, the Executive Branch, state governments, bar associations, and
law schools. 277 Senators and representatives, preferably Judiciary Committee members, must have considerable representation and must actively
participate, although federal judges ought to serve and provide much input. The chair should probably be a member of Congress, but could also
be a jurist, perhaps a Supreme Court Justice.
Congress must appropriate adequate resources to cover the costs of
hearings and travel and to support a staff comprised of full-time professionals. 278 Some of these personnel should have the expertise to undertake
extensive, empirical research in the social sciences, assess demographic
trends, balance conflicting data, and assemble additional information on
the future demands that the federal courts will confront.
The committee's membership and staff must be inclusive, and it ought
to maximize the involvement of interested individuals and organizations. 279 The group should enlist the assistance of public and private institutions such as the Judicial Conference, the FJC, the Justice Department,
21
• See BAKER, supra note 4, at 292-300; see also Thomas E. Baker, A Proposal That Congress
Create a Commission on Federal Court Structure, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 271 (1994); Tobias, supra
note 271, at 1627.
... See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109.
277
I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, supra note 4, at 296-99; Weis statement,
supra note 274.
278
I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, supra note 4, at 297.
279
I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, supra note 4, at 297-99.
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the Judiciary Committees, the American Bar Association, the American
Law Institute, and the National Center for State Courts, which possess a
wealth of information and expertise relating to the federal circuits. 280 The
committee must institute special efforts to draw on the experiences of the
states in reforming their appellate courts. 281
Congress should request that the entity pinpoint as specifically as possible the phenomena attributable to expanding appeals court dockets and
ascertain whether the difficulties are problematic enough to deserve treatment, and, if so, identify appropriate solutions. The commission must analyze these remedies in light of their potential benefits and disadvantages
and the appellate ideal. The group could then develop proposed legislative
reforms and criteria by which Congress can evaluate them. 282
Once this entity makes its recommendations to Congress, Congress
should evaluate the possibilities and draft measures incorporating the most
promising alternatives. 283 After the Senate and the House conduct public
hearings on these options, Congress can probably reach consensus on the
best means of addressing appellate caseload growth in the twenty-first
century. 284

C.

Suggested Improvements in Senate Bill 956

Much of the preceding discussion, in particular the evidence which
shows that splitting the Ninth Circuit is unnecessary and the relatively
few propositions favoring the court's division, demonstrates that Congress
should leave the Ninth Circuit intact. More specifically, bifurcation's numerical and qualitative detriments eclipse its benefits. Indeed, the weight
280
This list is obviously not intended to be exhaustive. See also BAKER, supra note 4, at 295-96
(affording additional suggestions).
281
See BAKER, supra note 4, at 298. The National Center for State Courts will obviously be
helpful in this regard. See generally COFFIN, supra note 153, at 43-65 (advocating the use of states'
experiences in fashioning remedies); DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS (1974) (same).
282
See BAKER, supra note 4, at 296-97.
283
I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, sitpra note 4, at 296-97. See generally
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 5, at 107 (the designers of any new judicial machinery will be
a success if they meet the needs of their generation).
9
• • The committee may experience difficulty specifically identifying those difficulties caused by
increasing caseloads or find that growing dockets are insufficiently problematic to deserve treatment,
and, even if they are more troubling, that less ambitious solutions than national approaches, such as
circuit-specific remedies, are more appropriate.
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of available evidence against circuit-splitting nearly dissuades me from
even advancing recommendations for improving Senate Bill 956, lest the
suggestions somehow be misconstrued as endorsing an approach that I
believe is flawed.
If the evidence already adduced fails to persuade the members of Congress, and they seriously consider S. 956, Congress should carefully explore ways to improve it. Perhaps most important, Congress should allocate the requisite resources, particularly the numbers of judges authorized,
that will enable the new Ninth and Twelfth Circuits to discharge their
responsibilities, especially to resolve appeals expeditiously, inexpensively,
and fairly.

The proposed legislation, as originally introduced, would have assigned
nineteen active judges to the new Ninth Circuit and seven active judges to
the proposed Twelfth Circuit. 2811 As modified, the bill allocates nineteen
judges to the proposed Ninth Circuit and nine judges to the proposed
Twelfth. 288 Certain factors complicate efforts to identify the exact number
of judges who would be appropriate for the two new circuits. For example, it is very difficult to predict with precision the number and complexity of filings that each court will receive, the speed with which the circuits
will resolve appeals, and the effects which division will have on the courts'
disposition rates. 287
Nevertheless, comparatively accurate estimates can be derived from
some relevant information. Most significant, increasing workloads led the
Ninth Circuit to request ten more judges in 1992, and the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended that Congress authorize the
judgeships the next year. 288 Indeed, Senator Gorton acknowledged five
years ago that the court's caseload would have justified the addition of ten
judges. 289
2

••

288

See 141 CONG. REC. S7497 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
See 141 CONG. REC. S10436-37 (daily ed. July 20, 1995).

287
Another important factor will be the new courts to which senior judges elect to be assigned
because the Ninth Circuit's senior judges have assumed a significant portion of the court's workload.
See s. 956 § 7. See generally PATRICK WALKER, THE WORK OF SENIOR JUDGES IN THE U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS DURING 1985, 1990 AND 1992 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statistics Division, 1994).
288
See Albert, supra note 45.
289
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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It is also possible to formulate reasonably reliable approximations by
compiling recent statistics involving the quantity, difficulty, and disposition rate of appeals arising from the proposed circuits' districts, adjusting
for applicable variables, and projecting these estimates into the future. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Executive Office calculated the number of filings per three-judge panel for the existing Ninth Circuit and the two proposed circuits.290
Those estimates show that Senate Bill 956's recommended allocation of
the Ninth Circuit's judges between the proposed courts will provide no
caseload relief to the new Ninth Circuit. Indeed, it would require that the
circuit hear a larger, more complex and more time-consuming docket than
the current Ninth and the proposed Twelfth Circuits. 291 Congress may
also want to allow for the predictable and unforeseeable difficulties which
will attend the creation of the two new circuits.
The above ideas, particularly the Executive Office figures, suggest that
Congress should authorize more than ten additional judges for the new
courts, a majority of whom would serve on the proposed Ninth Circuit292
and ought to assign this new court approximately three times as many
judges as the proposed Twelfth Circuit. 293 If Congress disagrees with
these recommendations, it should create sufficient number of additional
judgeships and distribute them between the two courts, so that the circuits
can perform their duties effectively. 294

a

••• See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
2 1
• See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
••• Both the total number of judges and their allocation are approximations that I derived primarily from the Executive Office statistics and Ninth Circuit and Judicial Conference requests. These
requests may be out of date in light of caseload increases. See supra notes 124, 137-43, 288-89 and
accompanying text. Indeed, it is arguable that Congress should assign all of the additional judges
recommended to the proposed Ninth Circuit, especially in light of the small, relatively uncomplicated
docket which the proposed Twelfth Circuit will have and the potential for underutilization of its
resources. See supra text accompanying note 148.
••• The multiplier is an approximation that I premised primarily on the Executive Office
figures. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. If Congress does not authorize additional
judges for the new courts, it should seriously consider allocating judges between the two circuits in
accordance with the multiplier. I realize that nine judges comprise a workable complement for constituting panels, but six would as well and would give the Twelfth Circuit the identical composition of
the First Circuit, the nation's smallest. See generally Breyer, supra note 257.
•o< The polestar that Congress should use and that I have employed is the effective discharge of
judicial duties. Similar considerations apply to the allocation of other resources. The Ninth Circuit
Executive's Office illustrates this. Congress should provide sufficient resources to replicate that entity,
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If Congress remains unconvinced by the evidence above and decides to
examine S. 956 seriously, it must prescribe a workable composition for
both new appeals courts. The difficulty with assigning states to the proposed appellate courts is that the current Ninth Circuit defies logical division. 295 The following attempt to identify a practicable realignment of the
court demonstrates that the existing circuit resists effective division, and,
indeed, that the better solution is to leave the court as presently
configured.
The Ninth Circuit as envisioned by Senate Bill 956 is one starting
point. As discussed above, any appeals court encompassing California
would serve more than thirty million people and confront an enormous
and complex caseload. 296 These considerations are magnified because S.
956 places in the Ninth Circuit Arizona with its large, increasing populace, and Nevada, which is the country's most rapidly growing jurisdiction, and both generate substantial appellate filings, many of which are
complex.
The proposed Ninth Circuit will have a large, complex docket and a
less favorable ratio of three-judge panels to appeals than the current
Ninth and the new Twelfth Circuits. The Ninth Circuit as contemplated
by Senate Bill 956 would, therefore, realize no actual caseload relief and
will have relatively few judges to treat a gigantic number of filings, many
of them complicated, in the near term, and this situation will only worsen
over time. 297 In short, the composition of the proposed Ninth Circuit
would be less satisfactory than the constitution of the current court.
The obvious alternatives to the Ninth Circuit which S. 956 prescribes
may be preferable. These possibilities include assigning Arizona, Nevada,
although any newly created Circuit Executive's Office will experience great difficulty attaining the
reputation for excellence of the Ninth Circuit Office. Resource allocations for buildings and other
technical details are beyond the scope of this Article, although Congress must consider them. See
supra notes 67-68, 146-48 and accompanying text. I feel compelled to reiterate that my recommendations should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of bifurcation, an approach that I believe is
flawed.
29
" See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
296
See supra notes 46-71, 137-40 and accompanying text. Because the disadvantages are more
important to the analysis here, I emphasize them.
297
Of course, Congress could respond to the new Ninth Circuit's circumstances by authorizing
additional judgeships. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text. Much of the above analysis
suggests that this would not be an optimal solution, particularly for the appellate system. See supra
notes 160-207 and accompanying text.
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Hawaii, Guam, or the Northern Mariana Islands to the new Twelfth
Circuit. Inclusion of either or both mainland districts will afford the proposed Ninth Circuit a measure of caseload relief. 298 However, this realignment would not create an appeals court consisting of adjacent jurisdictions that share a common background, 299 thus violating the Hruska
Commission's contiguity principle. 300 No states now designated to comprise the new Twelfth Circuit adjoin Arizona, and the major population
centers in Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington are located
far from those of Arizona and Nevada. Neither Arizona nor Nevada correspondingly has very much in common with the five northwestern states.
Instituting certain procedures, such as locating administrative units in
Boise or Reno and relying more heavily on technology, could ameliorate
the difficulties created by distance. Because the benefits of placing Arizona
or Nevada in the proposed Twelfth Circuit appear to outweigh the disadvantages, this may be a feasible, albeit unsatisfactory, approach.
California presents a conundrum. 301 Observers have found that assigning California's federal districts to separate appellate courts would be
problematic because each circuit could construe California law differently. 302 The Hruska Commission contended that the potential for inconsistency would not produce unmanageable complications, as the possibility
of inconsistency already existed in every regional appeals court. 303 Professor Hellman argued that "none of the conflicts likely to arise in the divided-state situation are unique" and predicted that the judicial system
could preserve "harmony between two federal appellate courts sitting
within one state." 304 Nevertheless, the Hruska Commission's recommendation that Congress split California was controversial in 1973 and
delayed legislative consideration of the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation for a
decade, 305 and the idea of dividing California has received relatively little
support since.
298
Inclusion of Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands would afford little caseload
relief, but would impose costs. See supra note 141.
••• See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. Consider the contrast between Arizona and
Alaska. Although Nevada adjoins Oregon, it differs substantially from the five states of the Pacific
Northwest.
300
See supra text accompanying note 25.
301
See supra notes 46-71, 137-38, 296 and accompanying text.
302
See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 238-39.
303
See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 238-39.
30
' See Hellman, supra note 22, at 1281.
300
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

1414

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

The notion of creating an appeals court consisting solely of California
has never been seriously entertained because of the significant disadvantages that it would seemingly impose. For example, the Hruska Commission observed that a "one-state circuit would lack the diversity of background and attitude brought to a court by judges who have lived and
practiced in different states" and described this characteristic as a "highly
desirable, and perhaps essential, condition" for constituting circuits. 308
The Commission was also concerned that one senator with long tenure
who actively participated in the appointments process could shape the
court for a whole generation. 307 In sum, the options proposed for directly
treating the problems that have been attributed to California are simply
impractical.
The Twelfth Circuit that S. 956 envisions offers more benefits than
detriments, but only if the substantial disadvantages which bifurcation
would impose on the new Ninth Circuit are ignored. 308 The benefits and
the detriments of the proposed Twelfth Circuit have already been examined thoroughly in this Article. 309
Perhaps most importantly, the very favorable ratio of three-judge
panels to appeals which Senate Bill 956 allocates to the Twelfth Circuit
and its relatively homogeneous, uncomplicated docket would afford considerable immediate and future caseload relief. 310 The relatively few
judges serving on the new Twelfth Circuit should also foster more collegial relationships and ,enhanced productivity among them. 311
A number of the projected gains, however, could fail to materialize, and
certain ostensible benefits might not even warrant that characterization.
Most importantly, it may be inaccurate to describe as advantages numerSee Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 237; see also supra note 56 and accompanying
text (affording similar ideas regarding diversity in Ninth Circuit).
307
See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 237; see also Hruska Commission, supra note 21,
at 236-37 (rejecting as "clearly inferior" a suggested realignment identical to S. 948 except that Arizona would be included in the Tenth Circuit).
308
The proposed Twelfth Circuit would be more likely to realize those benefits if Congress
appropriates sufficient resources.
309
See supra notes 137-43, 151-53 and accompanying text.
310
See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
311
See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
308
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ous significant gains which will accompany the Twelfth Circuit's highly
beneficial ratio of judges to filings and its less complex docket because
those advantages would accrue at the expense of the proposed Ninth Circuit. Some benefits will also be delayed or will be rather costly to achieve.
Furthermore, the smaller complement of judges might not necessarily b~
more collegial, and the Twelfth Circuit's size could sacrifice diversity and
the flexibility to make special assignments.
In sum, Senate Bill 956's plan to split the existing Ninth Circuit appears unworkable. Its detrimental aspects outweigh the advantages. The
proposed Twelfth Circuit would have a positive cost-benefit ratio, especially if its start-up and permanent expenditures are discounted, but this
would come at the expense of the new Ninth Circuit. Unfortunately, the
alternatives, particularly those which would expressly address California,
are only marginally more palatable. In the final analysis, Congress should
leave the Ninth Circuit as currently constituted and appropriate the resources that the court needs to fulfill its mandate. 312
CONCLUSION

In 1990, Senator Hatfield asserted that "for too long, the problems facing the Ninth Circuit, and the entire federal court system for that matter,
have not received the thoughtful attention of Congress and the public discussion they deserve." 313 This observation is equally true today as it was
in 1990.314

312
I have included the suggestions relating to experimentation in this footnote, lest textual placement give them undeserved validity and be misinterpreted as my endorsement of bifurcation, an approach which I consider faulty. Congress could mandate a broad range of experiments in the proposed
Ninth and Twelfth Circuits. The proposed Ninth Circuit, by virtue of its composition and caseload,
could continue to apply many of the experimental approaches involving, for instance, technology, on
which the current Ninth Circuit relies. The proposed Twelfth Circuit might wish to use these and
numerous additional options, such as prebriefing conferences, that other appeals courts have utilized.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, both because of the large number of judges and cases filed and the
recent split of the former Fifth Circuit, should be fruitful sources of ideas for more testing and for
anticipating and treating the predictable and unforeseeable difficulties which will attend division. See
supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
313
See BAKER, supra note 4, at 99 (citing S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 250-51) (statement
of Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield)).
••• Congress did enact the Civil Justice Reform Act later in 1990 after passing a Judicial Improvements Act in 1988. See Tobias, supra note 271.
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Division, however, will solve the difficulties neither of the Ninth Circuit
nor of the other appeals courts. Bifurcation will not remedy most complications that the Ninth Circuit in particular, and the appellate system in
general, will confront in the twenty-first century. The quantitative and
qualitative disadvantages of splitting appeals courts clearly outweigh their
advantages. Bifurcation would accomplish nothing new and would eliminate the best appellate court for experimenting with solutions to the
problems faced by large circuits. 315 Indeed, there is a lack of consensus
about whether burgeoning appeals court dockets cause problems that are
sufficiently serious to warrant treatment, especially with mechanisms that
are as controversial as circuit-splitting.
The import of the information which has been presented here suggests
that Congress should reject as anachronistic both the Ninth Circuit's division and the broader notion of creating additional judgeships and bifurcating appellate courts. A better approach appears to be structural modification, perhaps in the form of consolidation. If Congress finds this
proposal too controversial, it should explore additional circuit court experimentation and more study of appeals courts and their increasing
caseloads. Congress must attempt to identify as conclusively as possible
whether docket growth creates complications that are sufficiently problematic to be addressed, and, if so, with what measures. If Congress is not
convinced by the persuasive evidence against circuit-splitting, and, thus,
seriously considers Senate Bill 956, it ought to adopt the recommendations
for improving the proposed legislation presented in this Article.

310

See supra notes 32-37, 204-06 and accompanying text.

